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Motivated by the need to outsource file storage to untrusted clouds while still permitting con-
trolled use of that data by authorized third parties, in this dissertation we present a family of proto-
cols by which a client can evaluate a regular expression on an encrypted file stored at a server (the
cloud), once authorized to do so by the file owner. We present a protocol that provably protects the
privacy of the regular expression and the file contents from a malicious server and the privacy of
the file contents (except for the evaluation result) from an honest-but-curious client. We then extend
this protocol in two primary directions. In one direction, we develop a strengthened protocol that
enables the client to detect any misbehavior of the server; in particular, the client can verify that
the result of its regular-expression evaluation is based on the authentic file stored there by the data
owner, and in this sense the file and evaluation result are authenticated to the client.
The second direction in which we extend our initial protocol is motivated by the vast adoption
of resource-constrained mobile devices, and the fact that our protocols involve relatively intensive
client-server interaction and computation on the searching client. We therefore investigate an alter-
native in which the client (e.g., via her mobile device) can submit her encrypted regular expression
to a partially trusted proxy, which then interacts with the server hosting the encrypted data and re-
ports the encrypted evaluation result to the client. Neither the search query nor the result is revealed
to an honest-but-curious proxy or malicious server during the process. We demonstrate the practi-
cality of the protocol by prototyping a system to perform regular-expression searches on encrypted
emails and evaluate its performance using a real-world email dataset.
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Outsourcing file storage to storage service providers (SSPs) and “clouds” can provide signifi-
cant savings to file owners in terms of management costs and capital investments (e.g., [58]). How-
ever, because cloud storage can heighten the risk of file disclosure, prudent file owners encrypt
their cloud-resident files to protect their confidentiality. This encryption introduces difficulties in
managing access to these files by third parties, however. For example:
• Third-party service providers who are contracted to analyze files stored in the cloud generally
cannot do so if the files are encrypted. For example, periodically “scanning” files to detect new
malware, as is common today for PC platforms, cannot presently be performed on encrypted
files by a third party.
• With some exceptions (see Chapter 2), third-party customers generally cannot search the
files if they are encrypted. Searches on genome datasets, pharmaceutical databases, document
corpora, or network logs are critical for research in various fields, but the privacy constraints
of these datasets may mandate their encryption, particularly when stored in the cloud.
These difficulties are compounded when the third party views its queries on the files to be
sensitive, as well. New malware signatures may be sensitive since releasing them enables attackers
to design malware to evade them (e.g., [75]). Customers of datasets in numerous domains (e.g.,
pharmaceutical research) may view their research interests, and hence their queries, as private.
As a step toward resolving this tension among file protection, search access by authorized third
parties, and privacy for third-party queries, in this dissertation we develop a family of protocols by
which a third-party (called the “client”) can perform private searches on encrypted files (stored at
the “server”), once it is authorized to do so by the file owner, with various security properties. The
overall framework is demonstrated in Fig. 1.1. The type of searches that our protocols enable is
  Data Owner 
  Cloud Provider 
  (Server) 
Service Provider 
(Client) 
Figure 1.1: Overall framework: data owner stores encrypted data at the server, with which an
authorized client performs private searches.
motivated by the scenarios above, which in many cases involve pattern matching a file against one
or more regular expressions. Regular-expression searches are a widely adopted search primitive
in many languages and programming frameworks1 (e.g., see [38]). Multi-pattern string matching
is especially common in analysis of content for malware (e.g., [64, 50]) and also is commonplace
in searches on genome data, for example. In fact, there are now a number of available genome
databases (e.g., [2, 5]) and accompanying tools for multi-pattern matching against them (e.g., [12]).
1.1 Third-Party Private DFA Evaluation on Encrypted Files in the
Cloud
With the goal of improving privacy in such applications above, in Chapter 3 we develop novel
protocols to evaluate a deterministic finite automaton (DFA) of the client’s choice on the plaintext
of the encrypted file and to return the final state to the client to indicate which, if any, of the patterns
encoded in the DFA were matched. We stress that while there is much work on secure two-party
1To be more precise, the term “regular expression” is used in some frameworks in a way that follows but deviates
somewhat from its original definition. Our system supports searches using regular expressions as originally defined, i.e.,
searches that can be expressed as deterministic finite automata [43].
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computation including the specific case of private DFA evaluation on a private file, very few works
have anticipated the possibility that the file is available only in encrypted form. This setting will
become more common as data-storage outsourcing grows.
The security properties we prove for our protocols include privacy of the DFA and file contents
against arbitrary server adversaries, and privacy of the file (except what is revealed by the evaluation
result) against honest-but-curious client adversaries. Though our proofs are limited to only honest-
but-curious client adversaries, we also provide heuristic justification for the security of our protocols
against arbitrary client adversaries. Our protocols appear to be extensible with standard techniques
to provably protect file privacy against arbitrary client adversaries, but we stop short of doing so in
light of the substantially greater cost it would impose and our motivating scenarios involving third
parties that the file owner must authorize and so presumably trusts to some extent. We do, however,
discuss efficient heuristics to detect a misbehaving client or server that highlight new opportunities
in the cloud storage setting.
A central observation that facilitates our protocols is that a DFA transition function can be
encoded as a bivariate polynomial over the ring of an additively homomorphic encryption scheme
with which the file characters are encrypted. In our protocols, the client, who has this polynomial as
input, and the server, who has the encrypted file as input, obliviously perform DFA state transitions
by jointly evaluating this polynomial. Neither party learns the current state at any point of the
protocol execution; instead, they share the current state at each step, requiring that the polynomial
be adapted in each round to accommodate this sharing.
We believe our protocols will be efficient enough for many practical scenarios. They support
evaluation of any DFA over an alphabet Σ on any file consisting of ℓ symbols drawn from Σ, and
require the file to be stored using ℓm ciphertexts where m = |Σ|. Since m is a multiplicative
factor in the storage cost, our protocols are best suited small alphabets Σ, e.g., bits (m = 2), bytes
(m = 256), alphanumeric characters (m = 36), or DNA nucleotides (m = 4 for “A”, “C”, “G”, and
“T”). Specifically, in Chapter 3, we first present a protocol that leverages additively homomorphic
encryption (e.g., [59]) and transmits (nm+3)ℓ+3 ciphertexts to evaluate a DFA of n states. We then
leverage additively homomorphic encryption that also supports one homomorphic multiplication of
ciphertexts (e.g., [17]) to construct an improved protocol that transmits only (n + m + 1)ℓ + 3
ciphertexts. Our techniques could also be utilized with fully homomorphic encryption to produce a
3
noninteractive protocol with a communication cost of O(nm) fully homomorphic ciphertexts and,
in particular, that is independent of the file length ℓ.
1.2 Ensuring File Authenticity in Private DFA Evaluation on Encrypted
Files in the Cloud
Even though our protocols provide provable privacy guarantees for both the DFA query and file
content against arbitrarily malicious server adversaries, a malicious server could still try to tamper
with the evaluation result by deviating from the protocol specification, or even input fraudulent en-
crypted files into the protocol to fool the client. Indeed, though the traditional notion of a protocol
secure against an arbitrarily malicious adversary prevent any misbehaviors during protocol execu-
tion, it provides no guarantees on what input a malicious party may use in the protocol. Protocols
for a third-party client to perform private searches on encrypted data in the cloud, while revealing
nothing to the cloud server and nothing but the search result to the client, do exist for some types
of searches (e.g., [67, 28, 73]). To our knowledge, however, none also enforce that the cloud server
employs the data that the data owner stored at the cloud server.
Motivated by this, in Chapter 4 we present a strengthened protocol that allows the client to
detect any misbehavior of the server, and in particular, to tell whether the server input the authentic
encrypted file stored there by the data owner. In that sense, the authenticity of the file input by the
server and the integrity of the computation result are both enforced. At the same time, the protocol
provably protects the file contents (except for the result of the computation) from an honest-but-
curious client (and heuristically from even a malicious client) and provably protects both the file
contents and DFA from an arbitrarily malicious server. To our knowledge, our protocol is the first
example of performing secure DFA computation on both encrypted and authenticated data.
Traditionally, one needs to know the file content and the signature to verify the authenticity
of a file, and so the main technical difficulty in our case is to ensure computation on authenticated
(signed) data without disclosing the plaintext to either party. The most common approach one might
first consider to solve this problem is to leverage zero-knowledge proof techniques. By asking the
data owner to publish commitments of the file character signatures, the server might then prove that
his input used in the protocol is consistent with the published commitments. In the ways we see to
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instantiate this intuition, however, it would require much higher computation and communication
costs than our protocol. Instead, we introduce a new technique to enforce correct server behavior and
the authenticity of the input on which it is allowed to operate, without relying on zero-knowledge
proofs at all. At a high level, the protocol takes advantage of the verifiability of the computation
result to check the correctness of the server behavior. The protocol is designed so that that legitimate
outputs are encoded in a small space only known to the client, and any malicious behavior by the
server will result in the final output lying outside this space, which is then easily detected by the
client. We prove this property (in the random oracle model) and the privacy of both the file and the
DFA against an arbitrarily malicious server. We also prove the privacy of the file (except for the
result of the DFA evaluation) against an honest-but-curious client.
1.3 Toward Practical Encrypted Email That Supports Private, Regular-
Expression Searches
As a practical application of private regular expression searches on encrypted data, in Chapter 5
we report a case study of a prototype implementation using our protocol to perform private regular
expression searches on encrypted emails. In particular, the protocol developed there suffices to sup-
port the search options (including Boolean combinations) offered by the Thunderbird email client
for the text and numeric email fields, for example. Our system is thus able to support range queries
on the date field and various types of substring queries on the source, destination, and subject fields
of emails.
Our attention on the application of searchable encrypted emails was drawn from the numerous
designs of socalled searchable encryption schemes that have been proposed with it as one of the
main application. Unfortunately, to our knowledge few have made it to practical use. We believe that
this state of affairs is due in part due to inflexibility, in the sense that such schemes typically require
the document creator to tag it by the keywords on which searches will be supported in the future.
Even though one can imagine tagging and encrypting all the words in an document to allow for all
searches on any word, anything from a typo in the document to different forms of word stemming
will render the search results unsatisfactory. For example, a document tagged with the keyword
“meetings” would not be returned in the search results for the queries “meet” or “meeting”. A recent
5
study of user email query patterns [40] showed that many queries that users create are only partial
words, and so substring searching capability is important to provide an adequate user experience.
Furthermore, very few searchable encryption schemes offer the capabilities of performing substring,
conjunctive, disjunctive and range queries, and we are aware of none that offers all them at the same
time.
Our protocol for regular-expression searching gains computational efficiency by using interac-
tion, in fact requiring data transfer between the searching client and the server holding the ciphertext
of a volume larger than the searchable ciphertext itself. This obviously begs the question of whether
a more suitable solution would be to download each email to the client and decrypt it there, to be
searched locally. With the widespread use of volume-priced networking (i.e., over cellular data
plans), however, neither design is particularly appealing. So, we instead explore a different design
in which the user (e.g., via her mobile device) submits her encrypted regular expression (or suitable
representation thereof) to a proxy, which then interacts with the server hosting the encrypted data
using our protocol. After this interaction, the proxy reports information back to the user that permits
her to determine whether there was a match, so she can retrieve the file from the server in that case.
We stress that the interaction between the user and the proxy is independent of the lengths and num-
ber of ciphertexts stored at the server, and that the proxy is untrusted for the privacy of the search or
the file contents (provided that it does not collaborate maliciously with the server). So, for example,
the proxy could be run in a cloud distinct from that where the server is run.
The task of constructing such a protocol to be efficient is, as we found, very challenging. Start-
ing from a protocol that implements the above functionality, we detail a series of optimizations
that resulted in an optimized protocol with more than an order of magnitude improvement in the
performance. At a high level, the optimizations involve careful redesign of the protocol in order
to take advantage of well known algebraic optimization techniques (e.g., preprocessing to optimize
pairing operations) and a few novel algebraic techniques to reduce the online computational costs.
After detailing these protocol optimizations, we then explore additional optimizations that leverage
specifics of the email setting. These optimizations pertain to the specific regular expression alpha-
bet that should be utilized for each type of searchable field (i.e., source email address, sender name,
date, and subject).
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Following these optimizations, we detail an implementation of our protocol and its performance
when searching emails from a real-world email dataset. We show, for example, that our implemen-
tation incurs average latencies of 0.89 seconds per email for performing a 9-character substring
search on the sender email address field, and 0.17 seconds per email for performing a range query
spanning about 6 months on the email date field. These numbers were obtained from a proxy and
server each having 8 physical cores with simultaneous multithreading enabled, yielding 16 logical
cores. We also evaluate options for exploiting parallelism with our protocol, ranging from very
coarse (i.e., one server thread and one proxy thread per server-proxy protocol instance, but running
16 protocols instances in parallel) to very fine (i.e., 16 server threads and 16 proxy threads in one
protocol instance).
1.4 Contributions
In summary, the contributions of this dissertation are:
• We developed protocols (in Chapter 3) that enable a client having a private regular expression
to evaluate on the encrypted file stored at a server, once authorized to do so by the file owner.
Our protocols contribute over prior work by offering the protection of the privacy of the file
content against both server and client. More precisely, the protocols protect privacy of the
query and file content against arbitrarily malicious server adversaries and honest-but-curious
client adversaries.
• In Chapter 4, we present a extension of the protocol developed in Chapter 3 so that, in addition
to offering the security guarantees already provided by the original protocol, the client is able
to detect any misbehavior of a server adversary. Furthermore, it can even tell whether the
server input the authentic encrypted file stored there by the file owner during the protocol
execution. Consequently, the input and the evaluation result are both authenticated to the
client. To our knowledge, this is the first protocol published that considers secure computation
on both encrypted and authenticated data in the context of DFA evaluation.
• To demonstrate the usefulness of private DFA evaluation in the real world, in Chapter 5 we
prototype a system using our protocol to perform private regular expression searches on en-
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crypted emails. Toward that goal, we developed another protocol, along with several optimiza-
tions that allows a user to securely delegate the search query to a proxy, which will interact
with the server where the encrypted email is stored to perform the search and return the result
to the user. The privacy of the query and the data are both protected against an arbitrarily
malicious server and an honest-but-curious proxy. We provide extensive evaluations on the




In this chapter, we discuss research that is related to this dissertation. We discuss general
techniques for secure computation in Section 2.1 and then protocols specifically tailored to private
DFA evaluation in Section 2.2. Protocols specifically targeted other types of search functionality are
discussed in Section 2.3. Previous work on research to ensure that authentic inputs are employed in
secure computation protocols is discussed in Section 2.4, and some previous implementation efforts
for searching on encrypted data are briefly surveyed in Section 2.5.
2.1 General Techniques for Secure Computation
The problem we study in this dissertation — i.e., privately evaluating a regular expression on
the plaintext of an encrypted file stored at a server — could be implemented with general techniques
for “computing on encrypted data” [63] or two-party secure computation [74, 37]. These general
techniques tend to yield less efficient protocols than one designed for a specific purpose, and our
case will be no exception. In particular, the former achieves computations non-interactively using
fully homomorphic encryption, for which existing implementations [33, 71, 66, 69] are dramatically
more costly than the techniques we use.
The latter utilizes a “garbled circuit” construction that is of size linear in the circuit repre-
sentation of the function to be computed. Despite progress on practical implementations of this
technique [54, 11, 60], this limitation renders it substantially more communication-intensive for the
problem we consider. In particular, in Chapter 5 we study the setting in which a user wishes to
outsource her (encrypted) search query to a partially trusted proxy machine; the proxy will interact
with the server hosting the encrypted data and report the encrypted results back to the user. One
requirement of the protocol is that the communication between the user and the proxy should be
minimized. Using our protocol, the communication cost in the direction from the user to the proxy
is only dependent on the size of the search query, and is independent of the number and size of the
file ciphertexts. We are unaware of how to achieve this property using garbled circuits, however.
Since the garbled circuit and its inputs are “unreusable” across different runs of the protocol, the
user would need to provide a number of inputs (in this case, encrypted queries) to the proxy that
equals to the number of files to be searched. Furthermore, the fact that in our construction, the
user-generated encrypted query can be used an unlimited number of times enables a subscription
service such that the proxy holds the encrypted query and periodically informs the user of the arrival
of matched emails, without any further communication from the user to the proxy. Again, we are
unaware of how to implement this functionality using generic garbled-circuit techniques.
An ingredient of our protocols in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 is a two-party sharing of the data
owner’s file-decryption key between a client holding the search query and the server holding the
encrypted file. By two-party secret-sharing the file-decryption key and using this to compute on
encrypted data, our protocols are related to those of Choi et al. [24]. This work developed a pro-
tocol based on garbled circuits by which two parties can evaluate a general function after a private
decryption key has been shared between them. This protocol can be used to solve the problem we
propose, but inherits the aforementioned limitations of garbled circuits.
2.2 Specialized Protocols for DFA Evaluation
Two-party private DFA evaluation, in which a server has a file and a client has a DFA to evaluate
on that file, has been a topic of recent focus. To our knowledge, Troncoso-Pastoriza et al. [70] were
the first to present such a protocol, which they proved secure in the honest-but-curious setting.
Frikken [31] presented a protocol for the same setting that improved on the round complexity and
computational costs. Gennaro et al. [32] gave a two-party DFA evaluation protocol that they proved
secure against arbitrary adversaries. Our work differs from these in that in all of our protocols, the
file is made available to the parties only in ciphertext form, and in our protocols in Chapter 5, even
the DFA is made available only in ciphertext form to a proxy to which the user delegates the search
to, so that the proxy need not be trusted with the privacy of the search query. In this respect, the
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protocol of Blanton and Aliasgari [13] is relevant; they adapted the Troncoso-Pasoriza et al. protocol
to an “outsourcing” model in which the client and server secret-share the DFA and file, respectively,
between two additional hosts that interactively evaluate the DFA on the file without reconstructing
either one. While our protocols utilize secret sharing, as well — in our case, of the file owner’s
file-decryption key — our protocol shares much less data and does not share the client’s DFA (or
thus require two parties between which to share it) at all. Furthermore, their protocol does not
support the asymmetric encryption of the file, which in the encrypted email application we consider
in Chapter 5 is the predominant method for preparing a private email for its intended recipient.
2.3 Specialized Protocols for Searching on Encrypted Data
Specialized protocols for performing searches on encrypted files or database relations have
also been developed. For example, searchable encryption [67, 36, 16, 22, 28, 6, 19, 9, 49, 62, 47]
enables a party holding a file-decryption key to search for attribute values in the ciphertext file
stored at an untrusted server. These techniques have been generalized to support more complex
queries, notably conjunctive [19], disjunctive [49] and range queries [65] and inner products [49].
Searchable encryption schemes typically achieve non-interactive queries on encrypted files, in part
by attaching “tag” information to the ciphertext of each file to enable the query operation. However,
broadening the supported search attributes typically requires expanding the tags, and so the sizes of
the tags are determined by the richness of the supported queries. In contrast, in our work the file
ciphertexts are independent of the DFA(s) to be evaluated (assuming a fixed alphabet Σ over which
the DFAs are defined), and the computation is performed interactively between the two parties.
Richer forms of pattern-matching and search (though still not encompassing DFA evaluation)
have also been studied in the two-party setting, e.g., by Jha et al. [45], Hazay and Lindell [41], Katz
and Malka [48], and Hazay and Toft [42]. Again, these works input the plaintext file to one party
and so do not directly apply to our setting.
Still other works have explored storing database relations at an untrusted server in a form that
hides sensitive attributes or associations between attributes while supporting rich queries, e.g., range
queries [44, 23] or SQL queries [39, 25]. The security properties offered by these techniques are
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usually heuristic, without formal definitions and proofs, and we are unaware of any designed to
support DFA searches.
2.4 Input Authenticity in Secure Computation
Most work in the area of secure computation generally does not consider the authenticity of
the inputs to the protocol. Indeed, the standard definition of security against arbitrarily malicious
adversaries for general two-party protocols provides no restrictions on what input a malicious party
may use in the protocol as long as he does not deviate from the protocol. The protocol we present
in Chapter 4 allows the client to tell whether the server actually uses the authentic encrypted data
of the data owner as input, in addition to the ability to detect any misbehavior by the server. In this
sense, our protocol provides an authenticated evaluation result to the client. To our knowledge, ours
is the first protocol to consider secure computation on authenticated data in the context of private
DFA evaluation. The main area of specialized protocols in which input authenticity has previously
been treated has been private intersection of certified sets [20, 27, 26, 68], in which the set elements
of each party much be certified by a trusted third party for use in performing the intersection.
2.5 Implementations of Systems That Allow Searching on Encrypted
Data
There have been some implementation efforts to prototype systems that support search oper-
ations on encrypted data. Kamara et al. [46] implemented a encrypted storage system using a
symmetric searchable encryption scheme that supports keyword search. Waters et al. [72] built a
searchable encrypted audit log system using an asymmetric searchable encryption scheme. Popa et
al. [61] presented a scheme supporting SQL queries on encrypted data and provided an implementa-
tion of an encrypted database using that scheme. The system we developed, described in Chapter 5,
enables private regular expression searches in an encrypted email system. To our knowledge, ours
is the first implementation supporting private regular expression queries on encrypted files.
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CHAPTER 3
Third-Party Private DFA Evaluation on Encrypted
Files in the Cloud
Motivated by the need to outsource file storage to untrusted clouds while still permitting limited
use of that data by third parties, in this chapter, we present practical protocols by which a client can
evaluate a DFA on an encrypted file stored at a cloud server, once authorized to do so by the file
owner. Our protocols provably protect the privacy of the DFA and the file contents from a malicious
server and the privacy of the file contents (except for the result of the evaluation) from an honest-
but-curious client (and, heuristically, from a malicious client). We introduce our main protocol
in Section 3.2 and an improved protocol in Section 3.3. We further present simple techniques to
detect client or server misbehavior in Section 3.4. Before that, we first define the studied problem
in Section 3.1.
3.1 Problem Description
A deterministic finite automatonM is a tuple 〈Q, Σ, δ, qinit〉 where Q is a set of |Q| = n states;
Σ is a set (alphabet) of |Σ| = m symbols; δ : Q × Σ → Q is a transition function; and qinit is the
initial state. (A DFA can also specify a function ∆ : Q → {0, 1}, for which ∆(q) = 1 indicates
that q is an accepting state. We will discuss extensions of our protocols to this case.)
Our goal is to enable a client holding a DFAM to interact with a server holding the ciphertext
of a file to evaluateM on the file plaintext. More specifically, the client should output the final state
to which the file plaintext drives the DFA; i.e., if the plaintext file is a sequence 〈σk〉k∈[ℓ] where [ℓ]
denotes the set {0, 1, . . . , ℓ−1} and where each σk ∈ Σ, then the client should output δ(. . . δ(δ(qinit,
σ0), σ1), . . . , σℓ−1). We also permit the client to learn the file length ℓ and the server to learn both ℓ
and the number of states n in the client’s DFA.1 The client should learn nothing else about the file,
however, and the server should learn nothing else about the file or the client’s DFA.
Because the file exists in the system only in encrypted form, some private-key information
must be injected into the protocol to enable a DFA to be evaluated on the file plaintext. Since
(only) the data owner holds the private key, one approach would be to involve the data owner in
the protocol. However, in keeping with the goals of cloud outsourcing, our protocols require the
data owner only to authorize the client to perform DFA evaluations with the server — but not
to participate in those evaluations herself. In our protocols, this authorization occurs by the data
owner sharing the private file-decryption key between the client and server. As a result, a client
and server that collude could pool their information to decrypt the file. Here we assume no such
collusion, however, for two reasons. First, we are primarily motivated by scenarios in which the
client represents a partially trusted service provider or customer, and so even if the cloud server
were to be compromised, we presume this party would not be the cause. So, we prove security
against only a client or server acting in isolation and with primary attention to only an honest-but-
curious client (though we also heuristically justify the security of our protocol against an arbitrary
client). Second, even without sharing the file decryption key between the client and server, the
functionality offered by our protocol (i.e., evaluating a DFA on the file) would enable a colluding
client and server to evaluate arbitrary (and arbitrarily many) DFAs on the file, eventually permitting
its decryption anyway. The only defense against collusion that we see would be to involve the data
owner in the protocol; again, we do not explore this possibility here.
Another potential form of collusion that we do not explicitly consider here is collusion between
the data owner and the server, presumably to learn the DFA used by the client. In our protocol,
however, the protection of DFA privacy does not depend on the security of the data owner’s file-
decryption key. Since the data owner is not involved in the protocol, it does not offer the server any
additional leverage in learning the client’s DFA.
1Since exposing the final state reduces file entropy by log2 n bits, presumably the server should learn n so as to
monitor for excessive exposure or to charge for the information learned by the client. Moreover, the client can arbitrarily
inflate n by adding unreachable states. As such, we consider disclosing n to the server to be practically necessary but of
little threat to the client. This stands in contrast to some other two-party private computation scenarios in which input-size
hiding has been a priority, e.g., private set intersection [8].
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Our protocols do not retrieve the file based on the DFA evaluation results, e.g., in a way that
hides from the server what file is being retrieved. However, once the client learns the final state
of the DFA evaluation, it can employ various techniques to retrieve the file privately (e.g., [35]).
Moreover, some of our motivating scenarios in Chapter 1, e.g., malware scans of cloud-resident
files by a third party, may not require file retrieval but only that matches be reported to the file
owner.
3.2 A Secure DFA Evaluation Protocol
In this section we present a protocol that meets the goals described in Section 3.1. We give
the construction in Section 3.2.1, and then we define and prove security against server and client
adversaries in Section 3.2.2 and Section 3.2.3, respectively.
3.2.1 Construction
Let “←” denote assignment and “s $← S” denote the assignment to s of a randomly chosen
element of set S. Let κ denote a security parameter.
Encryption scheme Our scheme is built using an additively homomorphic encryption scheme with




〉 denotes a commutative ring. Specifically, an encryption scheme
E includes algorithms Gen, Enc, and Dec where: Gen is a randomized algorithm that on input 1κ
outputs a public-key/private-key pair (pk , sk) ← Gen(1κ); Enc is a randomized algorithm that on
input public key pk and plaintextm ∈ R (where R can be determined as a function of pk ) produces
a ciphertext c ← Encpk (m), where c ∈ Cpk and Cpk is the ciphertext space determined by pk ; and
Dec is a deterministic algorithm that on input a private key sk and ciphertext c ∈ Cpk produces a
plaintext m ← Decsk (c) where m ∈ R. In addition, E supports an operation +pk on ciphertexts
such that for any public-key/private-key pair (pk , sk), Decsk (Encpk (m1)+pk Encpk (m2)) = m1+R
m2. Using +pk , it is possible to implement ·pk for which Decsk (m2 ·pk Encpk (m1)) = m1 ·R m2.
We also require E to support two-party decryption. Specifically, we assume there is an efficient
randomized algorithm Share that on input a private key sk outputs shares (sk1, sk2) ← Share(sk),






An example of an encryption scheme E that meets the above requirements is due to Paillier [59]
with modifications by Damga˚rd and Jurik [29]; we henceforth refer to this scheme as “Pai”. In this
scheme, the ring R is ZN where N = pp
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denote the product using ·
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of a sequence. For any operation op, we use top to denote the time
required to perform op; e.g., tDec is the time to perform a Dec operation.
Encoding δ in a Bivariate Polynomial over R A second ingredient for our protocol is a method for
encoding a DFA 〈Q,Σ, δ, qinit〉, and specifically the transition function δ, as a bivariate polynomial
f(x, y) over R where x is the variable representing a DFA state and y is the variable representing
an input symbol. That is, if we treat each state q ∈ Q and each σ ∈ Σ as distinct elements of R,
then we would like f(q, σ) = δ(q, σ). We can achieve this by choosing f to be the interpolation
polynomial
f(x, y) = R
∑
σ∈Σ











is a Lagrange basis polynomial and fσ(q) = δ(q, σ) for each q ∈ Q. Note that Λσ(σ) = 1 and
Λσ(σ
′) = 0 for any σ′ ∈ Σ \ {σ}.
Calculating Eqn. 3.1 requires taking multiplicative inverses in R. While not every element of a
ring has a multiplicative inverse in the ring, fortunately the ring ZN used in Paillier encryption, for
example, has negligibly few elements with no inverses, and so there is little risk of encountering an
element with no inverse. Using Eqn. 3.1, we can calculate coefficients 〈λσj〉j∈[m] so that Λσ(y) =
R
∑m−1
j=0 λσj ·R yj . For our algorithm descriptions, we encapsulate this calculation in the procedure
〈λσj〉σ∈Σ,j∈[m] ← Lagrange(Σ).
Each fσ needed to compute f(x, y) can again be determined as a Lagrange interpolating poly-
nomial and then expressed as fσ(x) = R
∑n−1
i=0 aσi ·R xi. In our pseudocode, we encapsulate this
calculation as 〈aσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[n] ← ToPoly(Q,Σ, δ).
Protocol steps Our protocol, denoted Π1(E), is shown in Fig. 3.1. Pseudocode for the client is
aligned on the left of the figure and labeled c101–c116; the server pseudocode is on the right of
the figure and labeled s101–s112; and messages exchanged between them are aligned in the center
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and labeled m101–m106. The client receives as input a public key pk under which the file (at the
server) is encrypted; a share sk1 of the private key sk corresponding to pk ; another public key pk
′;
and the DFA 〈Q,Σ, δ, qinit〉. The server receives as input the public key pk ; a share sk2 of the private
key sk ; the alphabet Σ; and ciphertexts ckj ← Encpk ((σk)j) of the k-th file symbol σk, for each
j ∈ [m] and for each k ∈ [ℓ] where ℓ denotes the file length in symbols. We assume that sk1 and
sk2 were generated as (sk1, sk2) ← Share(sk). Note that no information about sk ′ (the private key
corresponding to pk ′) is given to either party, and so pk ′ ciphertexts (ρ created in c107 and c115
and sent in m103 and m105, respectively) are indecipherable and ignored in the protocol. These
ciphertexts are included to simplify the proof of privacy against client adversaries (Section 3.2.3)
and can be elided in practice. We do not discuss these values further in this section.
The protocol is structured as matching for loops executed by the client (c105–c113) and server
(s103–s111). The client begins the k-th loop iteration with an encryption α of the current DFA state
after being blinded by a random injection π1 : Q → R it chose in the (k − 1)-th loop at line c109
(or, if k = 0, then in line c103), where Injs(Q→ R) denotes the set of injections from Q to R. The
client uses its share sk1 of sk to create the “partial decryption” β of α (c106) and sends α, β to the
server (m103). The server uses its share sk2 to complete the decryption of α to obtain the blinded
state γ (s104). We stress that because γ is blinded by π1, γ reveals no information about the current
DFA state to the server. The server then computes, for each σ ∈ Σ (s105), a value Ψσ such that
Λσ(σk) = Decsk (Ψσ) (s106) by utilizing coefficients 〈λσj〉σ∈Σ,j∈[m] output from Lagrange (s102).
The server then returns (in m104) values 〈µσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[n] created so that Decsk (µσi) = γi ·R Λσ(σk)
(s108).
Meanwhile, the client selects a new random injection π1
$← Injs(Q → R) (c109). The
client then constructs a new DFA transition function δ′ reflecting the injection it chose in the last
round (now denoted π0, see line c108) and the new injection π1 it chose for this round. Specifically,
it creates a new DFA state transition function δ′ defined as δ′(q, σ) = π1(δ(π
−1
0 (q), σ)) for all
σ ∈ Σ and q ∈ π0(Q) where π0(Q) = {π0(q)}q∈Q; we denote this step as δ′ ← Blind(δ, π0, π1)
in line c110. That is, δ′ “undoes” the previous injection π0, applies δ, and then applies the new
injection π1. The client then interpolates a bivariate polynomial f(x, y) such that f(q, σ) = δ
′(q, σ)
in line c111, using the algorithm described previously. The client then uses these coefficients and
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client(pk , sk1, pk
′, 〈Q,Σ, δ, qinit〉) server(pk , sk 2,Σ, 〈ckj〉k∈[ℓ],j∈[m])
c101. n← |Q|,m← |Σ| s101. m← |Σ|
c102. π0 ← I s102. 〈λσj〉σ∈Σ,j∈[m]
c103. π1
$← Injs(Q→ R) ← Lagrange(Σ)







c105. for k ← 0 . . . ℓ− 1 s103. for k ← 0 . . . ℓ− 1
c106. β ← Dec1sk1(α)




s104. γ ← Dec2sk2(α, β)
c108. π0 ← π1 s105. for σ ∈ Σ
c109. π1




c110. δ′ ← Blind(δ, π0, π1) s107. for i ∈ [n]
c111. 〈aσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[n] s108. µσi ← γi ·pk Ψσ












c113. endfor s111. endfor
c114. β ← Dec1sk1(α)








c116. return π−11 (γ
∗)
Figure 3.1: Protocol Π1(E), described in Section 3.2
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〈µσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[n] sent from the server (messagem103) to assemble a ciphertext α of the new DFA state
under the injection π1 (c112).
After ℓ loop iterations, the client interacts with the server once more to decrypt the final state.
It sends α and its partial decryption β to the server (m105), for which the server completes the
decryption (s112) and returns the result (m106).
Protocol Π1(E) can be modified to return only a binary indication of whether the DFA’s final
state is an accepting one, if the DFA specifies a function∆ indicating whether a state is an accepting
state. Specifically, the client can construct a polynomial F (x) such that F (q) = 1 if ∆(q) = 1 and
F (q) = 0 otherwise, for q ∈ Q. Then, rather than interacting with the server to decrypt the final
state, the client can interact with the server once to evaluate F (x) on the (unknown) final state and
again to decrypt this result.
For brevity, Fig. 3.1 omits numerous checks that the client and server should perform to confirm
that the values each receives are well-formed. For example, the client should confirm that µσi ∈ Cpk
for each σ ∈ Σ and i ∈ [n], upon receiving these in m104. The server should similarly confirm the
well-formedness of the values it receives.
An Alternative Using Fully Homomorphic Encryption Our technique of encoding the DFA
transition function δ using a bivariate polynomial f(x, y) over R could also be used with fully
homomorphic encryption [33, 71] to create a noninteractive protocol. The client could encrypt each
coefficient aσi of f under the public key pk and send these ciphertexts to the server, enabling the
server to perform computations c112 by itself. At the end, the server could send a half decrypted
final state back to the client, who would complete the decryption to obtain the result. This protocol
achieves communication costs ofO(nm), which is independent of the file length. That said, existing
fully homomorphic schemes are far less efficient than additively homomorphic schemes, and so the
resulting protocol will be less communication-efficient than Π1(E) for many practical file lengths
and DFA sizes.
3.2.2 Security Against Server Adversaries
In this section we show that the server, by executing this protocol (even arbitrarily maliciously),
gains no advantage in either determining the DFA the client is evaluating or the plaintext of the
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file in its possession. That is, we show only the privacy of the file and DFA inputs against server
adversaries. In this section, we are not concerned with showing that a client can detect server
misbehavior, a property often called correctness. Π1(E) could be augmented using standard tools
to enforce correctness, with an impact on performance; we do not explore this here. Instead, in
Section 3.4 we describe novel extensions to Π1(E) that could be used to detect server misbehavior.
We formalize our claims against server compromise by defining two separate server adversaries.
The first server adversary S = (S1, S2) attacks the DFAM = 〈Q, Σ, δ, qinit〉 held by the client, as
described in experiment Expts-dfaΠ1(E) in Fig. 3.2. S1 first generates a file 〈σk〉k∈[ℓ] and two DFAsM0,
M1. (Note that we use, e.g., “M0.Q” and “M1.Q” to disambiguate their state sets.) S2 then receives
the ciphertexts 〈ckj〉k∈[ℓ],j∈[m] of its file, information φ created for it by S1, and oracle access to
clientOr(pk , sk1, pk
′,Mb) for b chosen randomly.
Experiment Expts-dfaΠ1(E)(S1, S2)
(pk , sk) ← Gen(1κ)
(sk 1, sk2)← Share(sk )
(pk ′, sk ′)← Gen(1κ)
(ℓ, 〈σk〉k∈[ℓ],M0,M1, φ) ← S1(pk , sk2)





for k ∈ [ℓ], j ∈ [m]
ckj ← Encpk ((σk)j)
b′ ← SclientOr(pk ,sk1,pk ′,Mb)2 (φ, 〈ckj〉k∈[ℓ],j∈[m])
if b′ = b
then return 1
else return 0
Figure 3.2: Experiments for proving DFA privacy of Π1(E) against server adversaries
clientOr responds to queries from S2 as follows, ignoring malformed queries. The first query
(say, consisting of simply “start”) causes clientOr to begin the protocol; clientOr responds with a
message of the form n (i.e., of the form of m101). The second invocation by S2 must include a
single integer ℓ (i.e., of the form of m102); clientOr responds with a message of the form α, β,
ρ, i.e., three values as in m103. The next ℓ − 1 queries by S2 must contain nm elements of Cpk ,
i.e., 〈µσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[n] as in m104, to which clientOr responds with three values as in message m103.













if bˆ′ = bˆ
then return 1
else return 0
Figure 3.3: Experiment for IND-CPA security
responds with three values as inm105. The next (and last) query by S2 can consist simply of a value
in R, as in message m106.
Eventually S2 outputs a bit b
′, and Expts-dfaΠ1(E)(S) = 1 only if b
′ = b. We say the advan-








(S) where the maximum is taken over all adversaries S taking time t and selecting
a file of length ℓ and DFAs containing n states and an alphabet ofm symbols.
We reduce DFA privacy against server attacks to the IND-CPA [10] security of the encryption
scheme. IND-CPA security is defined using the experiment in Fig. 3.3, in which an adversary U
is provided a public key pˆk and access to an oracle Encbˆ
pˆk
(·, ·) that consistently encrypts either
the first of its two inputs (if bˆ = 0) or the second of those inputs (if bˆ = 1). Eventually U out-
puts a guess bˆ′ at bˆ, and Expt
ind-cpa
E (U) = 1 only if bˆ
′ = bˆ. The IND-CPA advantage of U
is defined as Adv
ind-cpa




E (U) = 1
)
− 1. Then, Advind-cpaE (t, w) =
maxU Adv
ind-cpa
E (U) where the maximum is taken over all adversaries U executing in time t and
making w queries to Encbˆ
pˆk
(·, ·).
Our theorem statements throughout this paper omit terms that are negligible as a function of the
security parameter κ.
Theorem 1. For t′ = t + tGen + tShare + ℓm · tEnc ,








that differs only by simulating clientOr so as to substitute all cipher-
texts produced with pk ′ with encryptions of a random injection π independent of π1 it chose as in
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Experiment Expts-fileΠ1(E) (S1, S2)
(pk , sk)← Gen(1κ)
(sk1, sk2) ← Share(sk)
(pk ′, sk ′) ← Gen(1κ)




for k ∈ [ℓ], j ∈ [m]
ckj ← Encpk ((σbk)j)
b′ ← SclientOr(pk ,sk1,pk ′,M)2 (φ, 〈ckj〉k∈[ℓ],j∈[m])
if b′ = b
then return 1
else return 0
Figure 3.4: Experiments for proving file privacy of Π1(E) against server adversaries
c109 (i.e., ρ ← Encpk ′(π), π $← Injs(Q → R) in c107 and c115). Then b is hidden information-
theoretically from S in Sims-dfaΠ1(E), since γ is a random element of R in s104 and since γ
∗ is a












We construct an IND-CPA adversary U that, on input pˆk , sets pk ′ ← pˆk and uses its own oracle
Encbˆ
pˆk
to choose between running Expts-dfaΠ1(E) and Sim
s-dfa
Π1(E)
for S by setting ρ ← Encbˆ
pˆk
(0, r) in
c107 and c115. (Aside from this, U performs Expts-dfaΠ1(E) faithfully, using (pk , sk) ← Gen(1κ) and



















































Note that U makes ℓ+ 1 oracle queries and runs in time t′ = t + tGen + tShare + ℓm · tEnc , due
to the need to generate (pk , sk), sk2 and create the file ciphertexts 〈ckj〉k∈[ℓ],j∈[m].
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The second server adversary S = (S1, S2) attacks the file ciphertexts 〈ckj〉k∈[ℓ],j∈[m] as in
experiment Expts-fileΠ1(E) shown in Fig. 3.4. S1 produces two equal-length plaintext files 〈σ0k〉k∈[ℓ],
〈σ1k〉k∈[ℓ] and a DFA M. S2 receives the ciphertexts 〈ckj〉k∈[ℓ],j∈[m] for file 〈σbk〉k∈[ℓ] where b
is chosen randomly. S2 is also given oracle access to clientOr(pk , sk1, pk
′, M). Eventually S2
outputs a bit b′, and Expts-fileΠ1(E) (S) = 1 iff b
′ = b. We say the advantage of S is Advs-fileΠ1(E) (S) =
2 · P
(
Expts-fileΠ1(E) (S) = 1
)
− 1 and thenAdvs-fileΠ1(E) (t, ℓ, n,m) = maxS Advs-fileΠ1(E) (S) where the
maximum is taken over all adversaries S = (S1, S2) taking time t and producing (from S1) files of
ℓ symbols and a DFA of n states and alphabet of sizem. We prove the following theorem:
Theorem 2. For t′ = t + tGen + tShare + ℓm · tEnc ,
Advs-fileΠ1(Pai)(t, ℓ, n,m) ≤ 2Adv
ind-cpa
Pai (t




Proof. LetExpts-file-0Π1(Pai) denote experimentExpt
s-file
Π1(Pai)
with b fixed at b = 0, and letExpts-file-1Π1(Pai)




Expts-file-0Π1(Pai) that differs only by simulating clientOr so as to substitute all ciphertexts produced
with pk ′ with encryptions of a random injection π independent of π1 it chose as in c109 (i.e.,
ρ ← Encpk ′(π), π $← Injs(Q → R) in c107 and c115). Proceeding as in the proof of Theo-




running Expts-file-0Π1(Pai) and Sim
s-file-0
Π1(Pai)
for S, i.e., by setting pk
′ ← pˆk and ρ ← Encbˆ
pˆk
(π1, π) in
c107 and c115. (Aside from this, U0 performs Expt
s-file-0
Π1(Pai)
faithfully, using (pk , sk) ← Gen(1κ)

















Sims-file-0Π1(Pai) (S) = 0
)
(3.2)
Now consider a simulation Sims-file-1Π1(Pai) for Expt
s-file-1
Π1(Pai)
that again differs only by simulating
clientOr so as to substitute all ciphertexts produced with pk ′ with encryptions of a random injection.




running Expts-file-1Π1(Pai) and Sim
s-file-1
Π1(Pai)
for S, i.e., by setting pk






















Expts-file-1Π1(Pai) (S) = 1
)
(3.3)
Finally, consider an adversary U that uses its oracle Encbˆ
pˆk
to choose between running Sims-file-0Π1(Pai)
and Sims-file-1Π1(Pai) for S. Specifically, on input pˆk = 〈N, g〉, U generates d2
$← ZN2 and invokes
S1(pˆk , sk2) where sk2 = 〈N, g, d2〉. Upon receiving 〈σ0k〉k∈[ℓ] and 〈σ1k〉k∈[ℓ] from S1, U sets
ckj ← Encbˆpˆk ((σ0k)j, (σ1k)j). Additionally, in the simulation of clientOr, U selects r
$← R
and sets α ← Enc
pˆk
(r) in c104 and c112 and β ← grα−d2 mod N2 in c106 and c114, so that
αd2β ≡ gr mod N2. (U also generates pk ′ itself and constructs all encryptions for pk ′ as encryp-
tions of a random injection.) When S2 outputs b
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Sims-file-1Π1(Pai) (S) = 1
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(3.4)






























Expts-file-1Π1(Pai) (S) = 1
)






The result then follows because each of U0 and U1 makes ℓ + 1 oracle queries and runs in time
t′ = t + tGen + tShare + ℓm · tEnc due to the need to generate (pk , sk) and sk2, and create the file
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Experiment Exptc-fileΠ1(E) (C1, C2)
(pk , sk) ← Gen(1κ)
(sk1, sk2)← Share(sk)
(pk ′, sk ′)← Gen(1κ+2)
(ℓ, 〈σ0k〉k∈[ℓ], 〈σ1k〉k∈[ℓ],M, φ) ← C1(pk , sk1, pk ′)




for k ∈ [ℓ], j ∈ [m]
ckj ← Encpk ((σbk)j)
b′ ← CserverOr(pk ,sk2,M.Σ,〈ckj〉k∈[ℓ],j∈[m])2 (φ)
if b′ = b
then return 1
else return 0
Figure 3.5: Experiment for proving file privacy of Π1(E) against client adversaries
ciphertexts 〈ckj〉k∈[ℓ],j∈[m]. U makes ℓm oracle queries and runs in time t+ tGen+ tShare+ ℓm · tEnc
for the same reason.
3.2.3 Security Against Client Adversaries
In this section we show security of Π1(E) against honest-but-curious client adversaries and
heuristically justify its security against malicious ones. Since the client has the DFA in its posses-
sion, privacy of the DFA against a client adversary is not a concern. The proof of security against
the client therefore is concerned with the privacy of only the file. However, by the nature of what
the protocol computes for the client — i.e., the final state of a DFA match on the file — the client
can easily distinguish two files of its choosing simply by running the protocol correctly using a DFA
that distinguishes between the two files it chose.
For this reason, we adapt the notion of indistinguishability to apply only to files that produce
the same final state for the client’s DFA. So, in the experiment Exptc-fileΠ1(E) (Fig. 3.5) that we
use to define file security against client adversaries, the adversary C = (C1, C2) succeeds (i.e.,
Exptc-fileΠ1(E) (C) returns 1) only if the two files 〈σ0k〉k∈[ℓ] and 〈σ1k〉k∈[ℓ] output by C1 both drive the
DFAM, also output by C1, to the same final state (denoted M(〈σ0k〉k∈[ℓ]) = M(〈σ1k〉k∈[ℓ])).
This caveat aside, the experiment is straightforward: C1 receives public key pk , private-key
share sk1, and another public key pk
′, and returns the two ℓ-symbol files (for ℓ of its choosing)
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〈σ0k〉k∈[ℓ] and 〈σ1k〉k∈[ℓ] and a DFA M. Depending on how b is then chosen, one of these files is
encrypted using pk and then provided to the server, to which C2 is given oracle access (denoted
serverOr(pk , sk 2,M.Σ, 〈ckj〉k∈[ℓ],j∈[m])).
Adversary C2 can invoke serverOr first with a message containing an integer n (i.e., with a
message of the form m101), to which serverOr returns ℓ (m102). C2 can then invoke serverOr up
to ℓ+ 1 times. The first ℓ such invocations take the form α, β, ρ and correspond to messages of the
formm103. Each such invocation elicits a response 〈µσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[n] (i.e., of the formm104). The last
client invocation is of the form α, β, ρ and corresponds to m105. This invocation elicits a response
γ∗ (i.e., m106). Malformed or extra queries are rejected by serverOr.
We show file privacy against honest-but-curious client adversaries C = (C1, C2), i.e., C2 in-
vokes serverOr exactly as Π1(E) prescribes, using DFAM output by C1. We define the advantage
of C to be hbcAdvc-fileΠ1(E) (C) = 2 ·P
(
Exptc-fileΠ1(E) (C) = 1
)




(C) where the maximum is taken over honest-but-curious client adversaries C
running in total time t and producing files of length ℓ and a DFA of n states over an alphabet of m
symbols. We prove:
Theorem 3. For t′ = t + tGen + ℓm · tEnc + (ℓ+ 1) · tDec ,
hbcAdvc-fileΠ1(Pai)(t, ℓ, n,m) ≤ Adv
ind-cpa
Pai (t
′, ℓm(1 + n))
Proof. Given an adversary C = (C1, C2) running in time t and selecting files of length ℓ symbols
and a DFA of n states over an alphabet of m symbols, we construct an IND-CPA adversary U that
demonstrates the theorem as follows. On input pˆk = 〈N, g〉, U generates (pk ′, sk ′) ← Gen(1κ+2)
and d1
$← ZN2 , and invokes C1(pˆk , sk 1, pk ′) where sk1 = 〈N, g, d1〉 to obtain (ℓ, 〈σ0k〉k∈[ℓ],
〈σ1k〉k∈[ℓ], M, φ), where M = 〈Q, Σ, qinit, δ〉 is a DFA. Note that d1 is chosen from a distribution
that is statistically indistinguishable from that from which d1 is chosen in the real system. For
k ∈ [ℓ] and j ∈ [m], U sets ckj ← Encbˆpˆk ((σ0k)j, (σ1k)j).
U then invokes C2(φ) and simulates responses to C2’s queries to serverOr as follows (ignor-
ing malformed invocations). In response to the initial query n, the adversary U returns ℓ and, in
preparation for the subsequent serverOr invocations by C2, sets q0 ← qinit and q1 ← qinit. For the
k-th query of the form α, β, ρ (0 ≤ k < ℓ), the adversary U sets π ← Decsk ′(ρ), γ0 ← π(q0), and
26
γ1 ← π(q1), and then sets µσi ← Encbˆpˆk (((γ0)i ·RΛσ(σ0k), ((γ1)i ·RΛσ(σ1k)) for σ ∈ Σ and i ∈ [n].
After this, U updates q0 ← δ(q0, σ0k) and q1 ← δ(q1, σ1k), and returns 〈µσi, 〉σ∈Σ,k∈[n] to C2. For
the last query α, β, ρ, adversary U computes π ← Decsk ′(ρ) and returns γ∗ = π(q0) (= π(q1)) to
C2. When C2 outputs b
′, U outputs b′, as well.
This simulation is statistically indistinguishable from the real system provided that C is honest-
but-curious, and so ignoring terms that are negligible in κ, hbcAdvc-fileΠ1(Pai)(C) = Adv
ind-cpa
Pai (U).
Note that U runs in t′ = t + tGen + ℓm · tEnc + (ℓ+ 1) · tDec due to the need to generate (pk ′, sk ′)
and sk1, to create the file ciphertexts 〈ckj〉k∈[ℓ],j∈[m], and to perform ℓ + 1 Pai decryption in the
simulation. U makes nm oracle queries in order to respond to each of the ℓ oracle queries following
the first, plus an additional ℓm queries to create 〈ckj〉k∈[ℓ],j∈[m].
We have found extending this result to fully malicious client adversaries to be difficult for two
reasons. First, Exptc-fileΠ1(E) does not make sense for a malicious client, since C2 is not bound to use
the DFAM output by C1. As such, C2 can use a different DFA — in particular, one that enables it
to distinguish between the files output by C1. Second, even ignoring the final state γ
∗ sent back to
the client, we have been unable to reduce the ability of the client adversary to distinguish between
two files on the basis of m104 messages to breaking the IND-CPA security of E ; intuitively, the
difficulty derives from the simulator’s inability to decrypt α values provided by C2. (The ciphertext
ρ enables the simulator to “track” the plaintext of α in the honest-but-curious case, but ρ might
contain useless information in the malicious case.)
Nevertheless, since only ciphertexts for which the client does not hold the decryption key are
sent to the client in those messages, we are confident in conjecturing that our protocol leaks no in-
formation to even a malicious client about the file, beyond what it gains from the protocol output γ∗,
assuming E is IND-CPA secure. Of course, the above proof difficulties for a malicious client could
be ameliorated by introducing zero-knowledge proofs to the protocol to enforce correct behavior,
but with considerable added expense to the protocol. Instead, in Section 3.4 we introduce more
novel (albeit still heuristic) approaches to detecting client (or server) misbehavior in our setting.
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3.3 An Alternative Protocol
The second protocol we present has the same goals as Π1(E) but incurs less communication
costs. Specifically, whereas the communication cost of Π1(E) is O(κℓnm) bits, the protocol we
present in this section, called Π2(E), sends only O(κℓ(n + m)) bits. Π2(E) accomplishes this
in part by exploiting a cryptosystem that is additively homomorphic and that offers the ability to
homomorphically “multiply” ciphertexts once. That is, the cryptosystem supports a new operator
⊙pk that satisfies Decsk (Encpk (m1)⊙pk Encpk (m2)) = m1 ·R m2, but the result of a⊙pk operation
(or any other ciphertext resulting from +pk or ·pk operations in which it is used) cannot be used in a
⊙pk operation. After we present our protocol, we will discuss various options for instantiating this
encryption scheme within it.
Protocol Π2(E) is shown in Fig. 3.6. Note that the input arguments to both the client and the
server are identical to those in Π1(E). The structure of the protocol is also very similar to Π1(E),
with the only differences being in how the server performs each loop iteration (s204–s212) and
how the client forms the new encrypted DFA state α (c212–c216). We now summarize the primary
innovations represented by these differences.
After the k-th m203 message, the server constructs an encryption Ψσ of Λσ(σk) (s206). Rather
than computing µσi ← γi ·pk Ψσ, however, the server sends 〈Ψσ〉σ∈Σ to the client in m204. Each
µσi is then built at the client, instead (c212–c214), which is the main reason we get better commu-
nication efficiency.
Since each µσi is built at the client, the server must send γ in m204. To hide the current DFA
state from the client, the server blinds γ with a random r ∈ R (s208–s209) before returning it. So,
the client needs to accommodate r without knowing it when performing the DFA state transition.
The client cannot perform the polynomial evaluation using the f(x, y) it constructed (c211) on the
〈µσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[n] as in Π1(E) since f(x, y) is designed for an input q ∈ π0(Q), not q+ r. To overcome
this, the client constructs a shifted polynomial f ′(x, y) such that f ′(q + r, σ) = f(q, σ) for all
q ∈ π0(Q), and so f ′(x, y) will correctly translate the blinded input to the next DFA state. What is
left to describe is how to construct f ′(x, y).
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client(pk , sk1, pk
′, 〈Q,Σ, δ, qinit〉) server(pk , sk2,Σ, 〈ckj〉k∈[ℓ],j∈[m])
c201. n← |Q|,m← |Σ| s201. m← |Σ|
c202. π0 ← I s202. 〈λσj〉σ∈Σ,j∈[m]
c203. π1
$← Injs(Q→ R) ← Lagrange(Σ)







c205. for k ← 0 . . . ℓ− 1 s203. for k ← 0 . . . ℓ− 1
c206. β ← Dec1sk1(α)




s204. γ ← Dec2sk2(α, β)
c208. π0 ← π1 s205. for σ ∈ Σ
c209. π1




c210. δ′ ← Blind(δ, π0, π1) s207. endfor
c211. 〈aσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[n] s208. r $← R
← ToPoly(Q,Σ, δ′) s209. γ ← γ +
R
r
s210. for i ∈ [n]





c212. for σ ∈ Σ, i ∈ [n]











c217. endfor s213. endfor
c218. β ← Dec1sk1(α)








c220. return π−11 (γ
∗)
Figure 3.6: Protocol Π2(E), described in Section 3.3
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σi ·R xi, then it suffices
if f ′σ(x+R r) = fσ(x) for all σ ∈ Σ. Note that
fσ(x−R r) = R
n−1∑
i=0





























































ensures f ′σ(x+R r) = fσ(x) and so f
′(x+
R
r, σ) = f(x, σ).
The client knows all the terms in Eqn. 3.6 except ri
′
. That is exactly the reason the server
sends in m204 the ciphertext νi of r
i, for each i ∈ [n] (see s211). The client can then calculate
a ciphertext aˆ′σi of the coefficient of x



















In our pseudocode, the calculations Eqn. 3.7 are encapsulated within the operation 〈aˆ′σi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[n]
← Shift(〈νi〉i∈[n], 〈aσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[n]) on line c215.
After the client obtains 〈aˆ′σi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[n] and 〈µσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[n], it performs polynomial evaluation at
step c216 to assemble the ciphertext of the next DFA state by taking advantage of the one multipli-
cation homomorphism of the cryptosystem. This is where the additional homomorphism helps to
achieve much better communication complexity.
The privacy of the file and DFA from server adversaries and the privacy of the file from client
adversaries can be proved for Π2(E) very similarly to how they are proved for Π1(E). In fact,
Theorems 1–3 hold for Π2(E) unchanged, once instantiated with a suitable encryption scheme E .
That said, certain choices of E can require that the protocol be adapted, as discussed below.
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Instantiating E Protocol Π2(E) requires an additively homomorphic encryption scheme E that
also supports the “one time” homomorphic multiplication operator ⊙pk . Perhaps the most well-
known such cryptosystem is due to Boneh, Goh and Nissim [17], and moreover, this cryptosystem
also supports two-party decryption with a cost comparable to regular decryption [17]. The primary
difficulty in instantiating E with this cryptosystem, however, is that decryption — and specifically
in Π2(E), the operation Dec2sk2 — requires computing a discrete logarithm in a large group, which
is generally intractable. That said, if the ciphertext is known to encode one of a small number of
possible plaintexts, then Dec2sk2 can be adapted to test the ciphertext for each of these plaintexts
efficiently. As such, to adapt Π2(E) to employ this cryptosystem, we can augment messages m203
and m205 with π1(Q) (listed in random order), for the injection π1 at the time the message is sent.
This would permit the server to perform Dec2sk2(α, β) in lines s204, s214 by testing for these n
possible plaintexts. It does, however, have the unfortunate side effect of enabling our proofs for the
analogs of Theorems 1 and 2 for Π2(E) to go through only for honest-but-curious server adversaries.
Π2(E) instantiated in this way still appears to be secure even against malicious server adversaries,
though at this point we can claim this only heuristically.
Two other possibilities for instantiating E in Π2(E) are due to Gentry, Halevi and Vaikun-
tanathan [34]2 and Lauter, Naehrig, and Vaikuntanathan [51]. The primary challenge posed by
these cryptosystems is that two-party decryption algorithms for them have not been investigated.
Each of these schemes is amenable to sharing its private key securely, after which decryption can
be performed using generic two-party computation [74, 7]. These instantiations retain Π2(E)’s
provable security against malicious server adversaries (i.e., the analogs of Theorems 1 and 2), but
Π2(E) instantiated this way may be less cost-efficient than Π1(Pai) for many values of n and m.3
Of course, customized two-party decryption algorithms for these cryptosystems could restore the
efficiency of Π2(E), suggesting a useful open problem for the community.
2Because we require the plaintext ring to be commutative, we would restrict the plaintext space of the Gentry et al.
cryptosystem to diagonal square matrices, versus the arbitrary square matrices over which it is defined.
3For example, for the Gentry et al. scheme, a “garbled” arithmetic circuit [7] for secure two-party decryption using
additively shared keys would be of size O(κ6 log5(n+m)) bits.
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3.4 Heuristics to Detect Misbehavior
In this section we describe simple extensions to our protocols to detect client or server mis-
behavior. The detection ability offered by these techniques is only heuristic, but they provide a
practical deterrent to misbehavior and, at least as importantly, highlight possibilities outside stan-
dard techniques (zero-knowledge proofs) that might be brought to bear to detect misbehavior in data
outsourcing situations.
Detecting server misbehavior We showed in Section 3.2.2 that both the file privacy and the
client’s DFA privacy are protected against an arbitrarily malicious server. That said, a malicious
server could cause the protocol to return an incorrect result by undetectably executing the protocol
incorrectly. Here we describe a defense that, while offering weak guarantees, gives insight into new
opportunities provided in the cloud outsourcing setting studied in this paper.
The central idea is that in addition to the authentic encrypted file, the data owner also stores
at the server (i) another “decoy” encrypted file of the same length as the authentic file and (ii) the
plaintext of the decoy file, digitally signed by the data owner. However, the server is not told which
one of the two encrypted files is the decoy. When a client wants to evaluate a DFA M on the
(authentic) file, it executes two instances of the protocol in parallel with the server on each of the
two encrypted files, while also retrieving (and authenticating, by its digital signature) the plaintext
of the decoy file. If the client’s DFA when applied to the plaintext of the decoy file evaluates to
state q, then the client checks that at least one of the two protocol executions results in q. If neither
outcome is q, then it detects that the server has behaved incorrectly. (Of course, if the client divulges
when it has detected the server misbehaving, then this might enable the server to infer which of the
encrypted files is the decoy, though the client could nevertheless report the misbehavior to the data
owner outside the view of the server.)
A malicious server could try to guess which file is the decoy and execute the protocol faithfully
on that file, while misbehaving on the other one to alter the result. Obviously the chance it guesses
correctly is 12 . A server could also misbehave for both files, hoping that one of the protocol execu-
tions results in the correct final state for the decoy file. The probability of succeeding in this attack
is a function of the decoy file and of the specific DFA that the client is evaluating. To improve
the probability of detecting a misbehaving server, the client could also create more DFA queries to
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evaluate on both files. Moreover, additional decoy files could be stored at the server to increase the
chance that a misbehaving server is detected.
Detecting client misbehavior A similar but slightly more involved technique could be used to
heuristically detect client misbehavior in our protocols. In this technique, at the beginning of the
protocol in which the client will use DFA 〈Q, Σ, δ, qinit〉, the server creates and sends to the client
another DFA 〈Q, Σ′, δ′, qinit〉 whereΣ′∩Σ = ∅, i.e., another DFA with the same states and the same
initial state but a different (and nonoverlapping) alphabet. Note that to create this DFA, the server
need only know Q and qinit, which in the absence of δ reveal nothing about the pattern for which
the client is searching (aside from the number n, which is conveyed to the server in the protocol
already). The client then executes the protocol using the combined DFA 〈Q, Σ ∪ Σ′, δ ∪ δ′, qinit〉.4
As above, the client runs two instances of the protocol in parallel: the server uses the authentic file
in one instance; in the other, it creates and uses another file of the same length but consisting of
characters in Σ′. After the protocol completes, the client sends the final states back to the server,
which checks to be sure that the pair of final states include the result of applying 〈Q, Σ′, δ′, qinit〉 to
the file it created before telling the client which of the pair of states is the correct result.5
This technique for detecting client misbehavior relies on the inability of the client to detect
which of the two files consists of elements of Σ and which consists of elements of Σ′— a property
that we argued heuristically in Section 3.2.3 holds against a malicious client. It also depends on the
file and DFA created by the server; as in the defense against server misbehavior above, this can be
strengthened with multiple DFAs and files.
4Because doing so requires the server to hold ciphertexts 〈ckj〉k∈[ℓ],j∈[|Σ|+|Σ′|]\[|Σ|], the data owner must additionally
provide these ciphertexts when it stores the file.
5Divulging the final states to the server reveals minimal information about the pattern for which the client was search-
ing (assuming the elements of Q are encoded as random elements of R), specifically whether the final state was qinit.
Even this leakage can be avoided by designing the DFA so it never returns to qinit.
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CHAPTER 4
Ensuring File Authenticity in Private DFA
Evaluation on Encrypted Files in the Cloud
In Section 3.4, we provided a heuristic method to detect server misbehavior in the protocols
developed in Chapter 3. Aside from its heuristic nature, this method offers a weak detection proba-
bility that can be amplified only at the expense of running more protocol instances in parallel. In this
chapter, we instead present a strengthened protocol, with rigorous security proofs (in the random
oracle model), that allows the client to detect any misbehavior of the server within a single protocol
run; in particular, the client can verify that the result of its DFA evaluation is based on the file stored
there by the data owner, and in this sense the file and protocol result are authenticated to the client.
Our protocol also protects the privacy of the file and the DFA from the server, and the privacy of the
file (except the result of evaluating the DFA on it) from the client. A special case of our protocol
solves private DFA evaluation on a private and authenticated file in the traditional two-party model,
in which the file contents are known to the server. Our protocol provably achieves these properties
for an arbitrarily malicious server and an honest-but-curious client, in the random oracle model.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. We review our goals in Section 4.1 and detail our
protocol and its security proof in Section 4.2. We then discuss extensions in Section 4.4.
4.1 Goals
Recall that a deterministic finite automaton M is a tuple 〈Q, Σ, δ, qinit〉 where Q is a set of
|Q| = n states; Σ is a set (alphabet) of |Σ| = m symbols; δ : Q× Σ → Q is a transition function;
and qinit is the initial state. (A DFA can also specify a function ∆ indicating whether a state is an
accepting state or not, like we defined in Chapter 3, although we ignore it in this chapter.) Our
goal is to enable a client holding a DFA M to interact with a server holding a file ciphertext to
evaluate M on the file plaintext. More specifically, the client should output the final state to which
the file plaintext drives the DFA; i.e., if the plaintext file is a sequence 〈σk〉k∈[ℓ] where [ℓ] denotes
the set {0, 1, . . . , ℓ − 1} and where each σk ∈ Σ, then the client should output δ(. . . δ(δ(qinit, σ0),
σ1), . . . , σℓ−1). We also permit the client to learn the file length ℓ and the server to learn the number
of states n in the client’s DFA. (Indeed, because the DFA output leaks log n bits about the file to the
client, the server should know n to measure the leakage to the client and to limit the number of DFA
queries the client is allowed, accordingly.) However, the client should learn nothing else about the
file; the server should learn nothing else about the client’s DFA and nothing about the file plaintext.
An additional goal of our protocols — and their main contribution over prior work — is to
ensure that the client detects if the server deviates from the protocol. More specifically, we presume
that a data owner stores the file ciphertext at the server, together with accompanying authentication
data. We require that the client return the result of evaluating its DFA on the file stored by the data
owner or else that the client detect the misbehavior of the server. We do not explicitly concern
ourselves with misbehavior of the client, owing to the use cases outlined in Section 1.2 that involve
a partially trusted third-party customer or service provider (e.g., antivirus vendor). That said, we
believe our protocol to be heuristically secure against an arbitrarily malicious client.
4.2 Private DFA Evaluation on Signed and Encrypted Data
In this section we present a protocol meeting the goals described in Section 4.1: the client learns
only the length of the file and the output of his DFA evaluation on the file stored at the server; the
server learns only the number of states in the client’s DFA and the length of the file; and the client
detects any misbehavior by the server that would cause him to return an incorrect result. Again, we
do not consider misbehavior of the client here; the client is honest-but-curious only. In this section
we consider the file as static. The impact of file updates will be discussed in Section 4.3.
4.2.1 Preliminaries
Let “←” denote assignment and “s $← S” denote the assignment to s of a randomly chosen
element of set S. Let κ be a security parameter. Let ParamGen be an algorithm that, on input 1κ,
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produces (p, G1, G2, g, e) ← ParamGen(1κ) where p is a prime; G1 and G2 are multiplicative
groups of order p; g is a generator of G1; and e : G1 × G1 → G2 is an efficiently computable
bilinear map such that e(P u, Qv) = e(P,Q)uv for any P,Q ∈ G1 and any u, v ∈ Z∗p.
BLS Signatures Our protocol makes use of the Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) signature scheme [18].
Suppose (p,G1,G2, g, e) ← ParamGen(1κ) and let H1 be a hash function H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1. The
BLS scheme consists of a triple of algorithms (BLSKeyGen,BLSSign,BLSVerify), defined as fol-
lows.
BLSKeyGen(p,G1,G2, g, e): Select x
$← Z∗p. Return private signing key 〈G1, x〉 and public
verification key 〈p,G1,G2, g, e, h〉 where h← gx.
BLSSign〈G1,x〉(m): Return the signature H1(m)
x.
BLSVerify〈p,G1,G2,g,e,h〉(m, s): Return true if e(H1(m), h) = e(s, g) and false otherwise.
Paillier encryption Our scheme is built using the additively homomorphic encryption scheme due




〉 denotes a commutative
ring. Specifically, this encryption scheme includes algorithms PGen, PEnc, and PDec where: PGen
is a randomized algorithm that on input 1κ outputs a public-key/private-key pair (pek , pdk ) ←
PGen(1κ); PEnc is a randomized algorithm that on input public key pek and plaintext m ∈ R
(where R can be determined as a function of pek ) produces a ciphertext c ← PEncpek (m), where
c ∈ Cpek and Cpek is the ciphertext space determined by pek ; and PDec is a deterministic algorithm
that on input a private key pdk and ciphertext c ∈ Cpek produces a plaintext m ← PDecpdk (c)
where m ∈ R. In addition, E supports an operation +pek on ciphertexts such that for any public-
key/private-key pair (pek , pdk ), PDecpdk (PEncpek (m1) +pek PEncpek (m2)) = m1 +R m2. Using
+pek , it is possible to implement ·pek for which PDecpdk (m2 ·pek PEncpek (m1)) = m1 ·R m2.
In Paillier encryption, the ring R is ZN , the ciphertext space C〈N,g〉 is Z
∗
N2 , and the relevant
algorithms are as follows.
PGen(1κ): Choose random κ/2-bit strong primes p, p′; set N ← pp′; choose g ∈ Z∗N2 with order
a multiple of N ; and return the public key 〈N, g〉 and private key 〈N, g, λ(N)〉 where λ(N) is the
Carmichael function of N .
PEnc〈N,g〉(m): Select x
$← Z∗N and return gmxN mod N2.
PDec〈N,g,λ(N)〉(c): Return m =
L(cλ(N) mod N2)
L(gλ(N) mod N2)
mod N , where L is a function that takes input
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elements from the set {u < N2 | u ≡ 1 mod N} and returns L(u) = u−1N .
c1 +〈N,g〉 c2: Return c1c2 mod N
2.
m ·〈N,g〉 c: Return cm mod N2.
We use pek
∑
to denote summation using +pek ; R
∑





the product using ·
R
of a sequence.
4.2.2 Initial Construction Without File Encryption
We denote the file stored at the server as consisting of characters σ0, . . ., σℓ−1, where each σk ∈
Σ. Prior to storing this file at the server, however, the data owner uses its private BLS signing key
〈G1, x〉 to produce sk ← BLSSign〈G1,x〉(σk||k) for each k ∈ [ℓ]—i.e., a per-file-character signature
that incorporates the position of the character in the file1 — and stores these signed characters at
the server, instead. (Here, “||” denotes concatenation.) Note that since sk = H1(σk||k)x, anyone
knowing the corresponding verification key 〈p,G1,G2, g, e, h〉 cannot only verify sk but can also
extract σk and k, by simply testing for each σ ∈ Σ and k ∈ [ℓ] whether e(H1(σ||k), h) = e(sk, g).
As such, while in our initial protocol description, the data owner stores s0, . . ., sℓ−1 at the server,
this implicitly conveys σ0, . . ., σℓ−1, as well.
The basic structure of the protocol, which is similar to Π1(E) in Fig. 3.1, involves the client
encoding its DFA transition function δ as a bivariate polynomial f(x, y) over R where x is the
variable representing a DFA state and y is the variable representing an input symbol. In our protocol,
the client and server then evaluate this polynomial together, using a single round of interaction per
state transition (i.e., per file character), in such a way that the client observes only ciphertexts of
states and file characters and the server observes only a randomly blinded state. More specifically,




chosen by the client and where π : Q → R maps DFA states to distinct ring elements. The client,
with knowledge of π and ϕ, can calculate f(x, y) so that f(π(q) +
R
ϕ, σ) = π(δ(q, σ)) for each
q ∈ Q and σ ∈ Σ. Then, starting with a ciphertext of π(q) for the DFA state q resulting from
1The file name or other identifier could be included along with the character position, to detect the exchange of
characters between files. Similarly, the length ℓ can be included to detect file truncation. These issues are discussed
further in Section 4.3.
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The central innovation in our protocol is a technique by which the client, without knowing
sk, can compute an encoding of the file character σk that the server must use in round k of the
evaluation. If the server does not, it “throws off” the evaluation in a way that the server cannot
predict. As a result, if the server deviates from the protocol, the end result of the evaluation will
be an unpredictable element of the ring R, which will not correspond to any state of the DFA with
overwhelming probability. To accomplish this, the client defines the encoding of character σ ∈ Σ
and position k ∈ [ℓ] to be τ(σ, k, ψk) = H2(e(H1(σ||k)ψk , h)), where H2 is a hash function H2 :
G2 → R (modeled as a random oracle) and where ψk $← Z∗p is selected by the client in the round
for the k-th character. If the client sends Ψk ← gψk to the server in the round for the k-th character,
then the server can compute τ(σk, k, ψk) for the file character σk as τ(σk, k, ψk) = H2(e(sk,Ψk)).
However, without ψk the server will be unable to compute the encoding τ(σ, k, ψk) for any σ 6= σk.
The final difficulty to overcome lies in the fact that the client, by altering the encoding of each
character σ ∈ Σ per round k, must also recompute f(x, y) to account for this new encoding. As
such, the client recomputes f(x, y) to satisfy f(π(q) +
R
ϕk, τ(σ, k, ψk)) = π(δ(q, σ)) per round k,
for every q ∈ Q and σ ∈ Σ. In our algorithm, we encapsulate this calculation as 〈aij〉i∈[n],j∈[m] ←
ToPoly(Q,Σ, δ, π,k, ϕk, βk, ψk) where 〈aij〉i∈[n],j∈[m] are the coefficients forming f, i.e., so that




j=0 aij ·R xi ·R yj . (The value βk will become relevant in Section 4.2.3 and
can be ignored for now.)
This protocol is shown in Fig. 4.1. The protocol is written with the steps performed by the
client listed on the left (lines c301–c320), with those performed by the server on the right (lines
s301–s313), and with the messages exchanged between them in the middle (linesm301–m306). The
client takes as input the data owner’s public verification key 〈p,G1,G2, g, e, h〉, a public encryption
key ek ′, and its DFA 〈Q,Σ, δ, qinit〉. (For the moment, ignore the additional input dk , which will
be discussed in Section 4.2.3.) The server takes as input 〈p,G1,G2, g, e, h〉, the DFA alphabet Σ,
and the signed file characters s0, . . ., sℓ−1, i.e., signed with the data owner’s private key 〈G1, x〉
corresponding to 〈p,G1,G2, g, e, h〉. (Again, please ignore the bk values for now. These will be
discussed in Section 4.2.3.) Note that neither the client nor the server receives any information
about the private key dk ′, and so values encrypted under ek ′ (θ in line c304, and ρ in line c309) are
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never decrypted or otherwise used in the protocol. These values are included in the protocol only to
simplify its proof and need not be included in a real implementation of the protocol.
At the beginning of the protocol, the server generates the public/private key pair (pek , pdk )
(line s302) that defines the ring R for the protocol run. The server conveys pek and the file length
ℓ to the client (m301). Upon receiving this message, the client selects an injection π : Q → R
at random from the set of all such injections, denoted Injs(Q → R) (c303). The client sends the
number n of states in his DFA in message m302. (To simplify our proofs, the client also sends the
chosen injection π encrypted under ek ′ to server, denoted by θ. We will not discuss this further
here.)
The heart of the protocol is the loop represented by lines c306–c317 for the client and lines
s304–s312 for the server. The client begins each iteration of this loop with a ciphertext α of the
current DFA state, which it blinds with the blinding term ϕk (c307) using the additive homomorphic
property of Paillier encryption (c308). The client also selects ψk (c310) and creates Ψk (c311)
as described above, and sends the now-blinded ciphertext α and Ψk to the server (m303). After
decrypting the blinded state γ (s305) and using Ψk and sk to create the encoding η = τ(σ, k, ψk)
for the character σk being processed in this loop iteration (s306), the server creates the encryption
of γi ·
R
ηj for each i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m] (s307–s311). After the server sends these values back to the
client (m304), the client uses them together with the coefficients of f that it computed as described
above (c313) to assemble a ciphertext of the new DFA state (c316).
After this loop iterates ℓ times, the client sends the state ciphertext to the server (m305). The
server decrypts the (random) state (s313) and returns it (m306). The client checks to be sure that the
result represents a valid state (c318) and, if so, returns the corresponding state as the result (c320).
4.2.3 Adding File Encryption
As presented so far, our protocol guarantees the integrity of the DFA evaluation against a mali-
cious server. However, the confidentiality of the file content is not protected from the server because
the signatures of the file characters are known to the server. With cloud outsourcing becoming in-
creasingly popular, there is need to enable a data owner to outsource her file to the cloud while
protecting its privacy, as well, against a potentially untrusted cloud provider. So, in this section, we
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client(〈p,G1,G2, g, e, h〉, server(〈p,G1,G2, g, e, h〉,
dk , ek ′, 〈Q,Σ, δ, qinit〉) Σ, 〈sk, bk〉k∈[ℓ])
c301. n← |Q|,m← |Σ| s301. m← |Σ|




c302. 〈N, g〉 ← pek , R← ZN s303. 〈N, g〉 ← pek , R← ZN
c303. π
$← Injs(Q→ R)




c305. α← PEncpek (π(qinit))
c306. for k ← 0 . . . ℓ− 1 s304. for k ← 0 . . . ℓ− 1
c307. ϕk
$← R
c308. α← α+pek PEncpek (ϕk)
c309. ρ← Encek ′(ϕk)
c310. ψk
$← Z∗p




s305. γ ← PDecpdk (α)
s306. η ← H2(e(sk,Ψk))
s307. for i ∈ [n]
s308. for j ∈ [m]






c312. βk ← Decdk (bk)
c313. 〈aij〉i∈[n],j∈[m]
← ToPoly(Q,Σ, δ, π,k, ϕk, βk, ψk)

















c318. if γ∗ 6∈ π(Q)
c319. then abort
c320. else return π−1(γ∗)
Figure 4.1: Protocol Π3(E), described in Section 4.2
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refine our protocol so that it provides the same guarantees while also protecting the confidentiality
of the file content from the server.
As we described our protocol so far, the server holds the BLS signature sk = H1(σk||k)x, which
enables him to learn σk by testing for each σ ∈ Σ whether e(H1(σ||k), h) = e(sk, g). So, to hide
σk from the server, it is necessary to change the signature sk to prevent the server from confirming
a guess at the value of σk.
To do so, in our full protocol the data owner randomizes the signature by raising it to a random
power, i.e., sk ← H1(σ||k)x·βk where βk $← Z∗p. sk then does not leak information about σk to the
server because it is randomly distributed in G1. However, this randomization also introduces new
difficulties for the server and client to perform the DFA evaluation, since both of them need to be
able to compute the same encoding for each σk despite sk being randomized in this way.
To facilitate this evaluation, the data owner encrypts βk under a public key ek of an encryption
scheme whose plaintext space includes Z∗p and provides its ciphertext, denoted bk, along with sk
to the server; see the input arguments to server in Fig. 4.1. Of course, the server should not be
able to decrypt bk, since this would again enable him to reconstruct σk. As such, the data owner
provides the corresponding private decryption key dk only to the client; see the input arguments to
the client. Analogous to previous protocols [73], conveying dk can serve as a step by which the data
owner authorizes a client to perform DFA queries on its file stored at the server. (In Section 4.4, we
summarize an alternative approach that does not disclose dk or 〈βk〉k∈[ℓ] to the client.)
Given this setup, the full protocol Π3(E) thus executes the following additional steps. First,
the client defines the encoding of character σ ∈ Σ and position k ∈ [ℓ] to be τ(σ, k, βk, ψk) =
H2(e(H1(σ||k)βkψk , h)), where again H2 is a hash function H2 : G2 → R (modeled as a random or-
acle) and where ψk
$← Z∗p is selected by the client in the round for character k. Note that the client
needs to know βk to compute τ(σ, k, βk, ψk), and recall that the client needs to know τ(σ, k, βk , ψk)
for each σ ∈ Σ in order to compute f(x, y) to satisfy f(π(q) +
R
ϕk, τ(σ, k, βk , ψk)) = π(δ(q, σ))
for every q ∈ Q and σ ∈ Σ. Therefore, it is necessary for the client to include βk as an argument
to the ToPoly call (i.e., ToPoly(Q,Σ, δ, π, k, ϕk , βk, ψk) in c313) and to delay that call until after
receiving bk in m304 and using it to obtain βk (c312).
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4.2.4 Complexity
Protocol Π3(E) has a communication complexity ofO(ℓmnκ2) bits, dominated by the message
m304 sent by the server in each round. The storage cost on the server depends on the number of
BLS signatures of each character of the file. Assuming a BLS signature of length roughly 170 bits
[18], it results in total 170ℓ bits for a file with ℓ characters. When using byte as character unit of a
file, that amounts to about 21 times blow up in terms of storage compared against the original file.
4.2.5 Security Against Server Adversaries
In this section we prove the security of the protocol against server adversaries. We separately
consider the DFA privacy, file privacy and the result authenticity against server adversaries.
DFA privacy against malicious server adversaries. Following the security definitions defined in
Chapter 3, we formalize our claims against server compromise by defining server adversary S =
(S1, S2) who attacks the DFA M = 〈Q, Σ, δ, qinit〉 held by the client, as described in experiment
Expts-dfaΠ3(E) in Fig. 4.2a. S1 is given the BLS signature verification key vk = 〈p,G1,G2, g, e, h〉
and a public key ek of an IND-CPA secure encryption scheme, and generates a file 〈σk〉k∈[ℓ] and
two DFAs M0 and M1. S2 then receives vk, the ciphertexts 〈sk, bk〉k∈[ℓ] of its file, information φ
created for it by S1, and oracle access to clientOr(vk, dk , ek
′,Mb) for b chosen randomly.
clientOr responds to queries from S2 as follows, ignoring malformed queries. S2 initiates by
sending a paillier encryption public key pek and an integer ℓ (as inm301). clientOr responds with a
message containing an integer n and a ciphertext θ (i.e., of the form of m302). In addition, clientOr
sends a message of the form α, ρ, Ψk, where α ∈ Cpek , ρ ∈ Cek ′ and Ψk ∈ G1, i.e., three values
as in m303. The next ℓ queries by S2 must contain nm elements of Cpek and an element of Cek ,
i.e., 〈µij〉i∈[n],j∈[m] and bk as in m304, to which clientOr responds with three values as in message
m303. After that, clientOr sends another ciphertext α of Cpek as inm305. The next (and last) query
by S2 can consist simply of a value in R, as in message m306.
Eventually S2 outputs a bit b
′, and Expts-dfaΠ3(E)(S) = 1 only if b
′ = b. We say the advan-








(S) where the maximum is taken over all adversaries S taking time t, selecting a
file of length ℓ and DFAs containing n states and an alphabet ofm symbols.
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Experiment Expts-dfaΠ3(E)(S1, S2)
(p,G1,G2, g, e) ← ParamGen(1κ)
(〈p,G1,G2, g, e, h〉, 〈G1 , x〉) ← BLSKeyGen(p,G1,G2, g, e)
vk ← 〈p,G1,G2, g, e, h〉
(ek , dk) ← Gen(1κ)
(ek ′, dk ′)← Gen(1κ+2)
(ℓ, 〈σk〉k∈[ℓ],M0,M1, φ) ← S1(vk, ek )
if |M0.Q| 6= |M1.Q| orM0.Σ 6= M1.Σ then return 0
b
$← {0, 1}





bk ← Encek (βk)
b′ ← SclientOr(vk,dk ,ek ′,Mb)2 (φ, vk,Mb.Σ, 〈sk, bk〉k∈[ℓ])




Experiment Expts-fileΠ3(E) (S1, S2)
(p,G1,G2, g, e) ← ParamGen(1κ)
(〈p,G1,G2, g, e, h〉, 〈G1 , x〉) ← BLSKeyGen(p,G1,G2, g, e)
vk ← 〈p,G1,G2, g, e, h〉
(ek , dk) ← Gen(1κ)
(ek ′, dk ′)← Gen(1κ+2)
(ℓ, 〈σ0k〉k∈[ℓ], 〈σ1k〉k∈[ℓ],M, φ) ← S1(vk, ek)
b
$← {0, 1}





bk ← Encek (βk)
b′ ← SclientOr(vk,dk ,ek ′,M),H1(·)2 (φ, vk,M.Σ, 〈sk , bk〉k∈[ℓ])




Figure 4.2: Experiments for proving DFA and file privacy of Π3(E) against server adversaries
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We reduce DFA privacy against server attacks to the IND-CPA [10] security of the encryption
scheme. IND-CPA security is defined using the experiment in Fig. 3.3 in Chapter 3, in which an
adversary U is provided a public key pˆk and access to an oracle Encbˆ
pˆk
(·, ·) that consistently encrypts
either the first of its two inputs (if bˆ = 0) or the second of those inputs (if bˆ = 1). Eventually U
outputs a guess bˆ′ at bˆ, and Expt
ind-cpa
E (U) = 1 only if bˆ
′ = bˆ. The IND-CPA advantage of
U is defined as Adv
ind-cpa




E (U) = 1
)
− 1. Then, Advind-cpaE (t, w) =
maxU Adv
ind-cpa
E (U) where the maximum is taken over all adversaries U executing in time t and
making w queries to Encbˆ
pˆk
(·, ·).
We now prove the DFA privacy of the protocol.
Theorem 4. For t′ = t + tParamGen + tBLSKeyGen + tGen + ℓ · (tBLSSign + tEnc),




Proof. Let S be an adversary meeting the parameters t, ℓ, n, m. Consider a simulation Sims-dfaΠ3(E)
for Expts-dfaΠ3(E) that differs only by simulating clientOr so as to substitute the ciphertext produced
with ek ′ in c304 with encryptions of a random injection π′ independent of π it chose as in c303
(i.e., ρ ← Encpk ′(π′), π′ $← Injs(Q → R)) and to substitute all ciphertexts created in c309 with
encryptions of zero. Then b is hidden information-theoretically from S in Sims-dfaΠ3(E), since γ is a
random element of R in s305 (see c308) and Ψk is a random element in G1 (see c310), and since γ
∗












We construct an IND-CPA adversary U that, on input pˆk , sets ek ′ ← pˆk and uses its own oracle
Encbˆ
pˆk
to choose between running Expts-dfaΠ3(E) and Sim
s-dfa
Π3(E)
for S by setting θ ← Encbˆ
pˆk
(π, π′) in
c304 and ρ← Encbˆ
pˆk
(r, 0) in c307. (Aside from this, U performs Expts-dfaΠ3(E) faithfully, generating
the BLS signature signing key 〈G1, x〉 and using (ek , dk ) ← Gen(1κ) it generates itself.) U then
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returns bˆ′ = 0 if S2 outputs b


















































Note that U makes ℓ+1 oracle queries and runs in time t′ = t+ tParamGen+ tBLSKeyGen+ tGen+
ℓ · (tBLSSign + tEnc), due to the need to generate BLS signature signing key, (ek , dk) and encrypt ℓ
file characters.
File privacy against malicious server adversary. Next, we prove that the protocol protects the
file privacy against an arbitrarily malicious server adversary. We define the server adversary S =
(S1, S2) attacking the file ciphertexts 〈sk, bk〉k∈[ℓ] as in experiment Expts-fileΠ3(E) shown in Fig. 4.2b.
S1 produces two equal-length plaintext files 〈σ0k〉k∈[ℓ], 〈σ1k〉k∈[ℓ] and a DFA M. S2 receives
the ciphertexts 〈sk, bk〉k∈[ℓ] for file 〈σbk〉k∈[ℓ] where b is chosen randomly. S2 is also given or-
acle access to clientOr(vk, dk , ek ′,M) and hash oracle access to H1(·). Eventually S2 outputs
a bit b′, and Expts-fileΠ3(E) (S) = 1 iff b
′ = b. We say the advantage of S is Advs-fileΠ3(E) (S) =
2 · P
(
Expts-fileΠ3(E) (S) = 1
)
− 1 and then Advs-fileΠ3(E) (t, ℓ, n,m, h1) = maxS Advs-fileΠ3(E) (S) where
the maximum is taken over all adversaries S = (S1, S2) taking time t, producing (from S1) files of
ℓ symbols and a DFA of n states and alphabet of sizem and making h1 queries to H1(·).
We now prove the following theorem:
Theorem 5. LetH1(·) be a random oracle. For t′ = t+tParamGen+tBLSKeyGen+tGen+ℓ·(tBLSSign+
tEnc),
Advs-fileΠ3(E) (t, ℓ, n,m, h1) ≤ 2Adv
ind-cpa
E (t




Proof. LetExpts-file-0Π3(E) denote experiment Expt
s-file
Π3(E)
with b fixed at b = 0, and letExpts-file-1Π3(E)




Expts-file-0Π3(E) that differs only by simulating clientOr so as to substitute the ciphertext produced
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with ek ′ in c304 with encryptions of a random injection π′ independent of π it chose as in c303
(i.e., ρ ← Encpk ′(π′), π′ $← Injs(Q → R)) and to substitute all ciphertexts created in c309 with
encryptions of zero. Proceeding as in the proof of Theorem 4, we construct an IND-CPA adversary
U0 that, on input pˆk of an encryption scheme E ′, sets ek ′ ← pˆk and uses its own oracle Encbˆpˆk to
choose between running Expts-file-0Π3(E) and Sim
s-file-0
Π3(E)
for S, i.e., by setting θ ← Encbˆ
pˆk
(π, π′)
in c304 and ρ ← Encbˆ
pˆk
(r, 0) in c307. (Aside from this, U performs Expts-dfaΠ3(E) faithfully, using

















Sims-file-0Π3(E) (S) = 0
)
(4.1)
Now consider a simulation Sims-file-1Π3(E) for Expt
s-file-1
Π3(E)
that again differs only by simulating
clientOr so as to substitute all ciphertexts produced with ek ′ with encryptions of a random injection
π′ independent of π it chose as in c303 (i.e., ρ ← Encpk ′(π′), π′ $← Injs(Q → R)) and to
substitute all ciphertexts created in c309 with encryptions of zero. As above, we construct an IND-
CPA adversary U1 that, on input pˆk of an encryption scheme E ′, sets ek ′ ← pˆk and uses its own
oracle Encbˆ
pˆk
to choose between running Expts-file-1Π3(E) and Sim
s-file-1
Π3(E)
for S, i.e., by setting θ ←
Encbˆ
pˆk
(π′, π) in c304 and ρ ← Encbˆ
pˆk
(0, r) in c307. (Aside from this, U performs Expts-file-1Π3(E)
faithfully, using (ek , dk ) ← Gen(1κ) it generates itself). Finally, U1 returns bˆ′ = 1 if b′ = b and
bˆ′ = 0, otherwise. Then,
1 +Adv
ind-cpa













Expts-file-1Π3(E) (S) = 1
)
(4.2)
Finally, consider an adversary U that uses its oracle Encbˆ
pˆk
to choose between running Sims-file-0Π3(E)
and Sims-file-1Π3(E) for S. Specifically, on input pˆk of an encryption scheme E , U generates (p,G1,G2,
g, e) ← ParamGen(1κ), (vk = 〈p,G1,G2, g, e, h〉, 〈G1 , x〉) ← BLSKeyGen(p,G1,G2, g, e) and
invokes S1(vk, pˆk ). Upon receiving 〈σ0k〉k∈[ℓ] and 〈σ1k〉k∈[ℓ] from S1, for each k ∈ [ℓ], U sets
H1(σ0k||k) ← guk for uk $← Z∗p andH1(σ1k||k) ← gvk for vk $← Z∗p. U computes sk ← gx·βk for
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βk
$← Z∗p and sets bk ← Encbˆpˆk (uk ·β
−1
k mod p, vk ·β−1k mod p). Note that the way that bk is com-
puted determined whether σ0k or σ1k is encrypted. U then invokes S2(φ, vk,M.Σ, 〈sk , bk〉k∈[ℓ]). In
the simulation of clientOr, U selects r
$← R and sets α ← Encpek (r) in c305 and c316 using the
Paillier public key pek it received from S2 in the first query (as in m301). (U also generates ek
′
itself and constructs an encryption of a random injection as in c304 and encryptions of zero as in
c309). For S2’s other queries to H1(·), for any query that was previously posed to H1, U returns the
value returned to that previous query, and for new queries, U generates a random element from G1.
Finally when S2 outputs b








E (U) = 1
)
= 2 · P
(









Sims-file-1Π3(E) (S) = 1
)
(4.3)






























Expts-file-1Π3(E) (S) = 1
)
= 2 · P
(
Expts-fileΠ3(E) (S) = 1
)
+ 2
= 3 +Advs-fileΠ3(E) (S)
The result then follows because each of U0 and U1 makes ℓ + 1 oracle queries and runs in time
t′ = t + tParamGen + tBLSKeyGen + tGen + ℓ · (tBLSSign + tEnc) due to the need to generate the BLS
signature signing key, (ek , dk) and encrypt ℓ file characters. U makes ℓ oracle queries in order to
create the file ciphertexts and runs in time t′ for similar reasons.
Detection of server misbehavior We first formally define what it means for a client to be able to
detect any server misbehavior. Such an experiment is shown in Fig. 4.3. In this experiment, S2
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Experiment Expts-authΠ3(E) (S)
(p,G1,G2, g, e) ← ParamGen(1κ)
(〈p,G1,G2, g, e, h〉, 〈G1 , x〉) ← BLSKeyGen(p,G1,G2, g, e)
vk ← 〈p,G1,G2, g, e, h〉
(ek , dk )← Gen(1κ)
(ek ′, dk ′) ← Gen(1κ+2)
(ℓ, 〈σk〉k∈[ℓ],M, φ) ← S1(〈p,G1,G2, g, e, h〉, ek )





bk ← Encek (βk)
π
$← Injs(Q→ R)
γ∗ ← SclientOr(vk,dk ,M,π),H1(·),H2(·)2 (vk,M.Σ, 〈sk , bk〉k∈[ℓ])
if γ∗ ∈ π(Q) ∧ γ∗ 6= π(M(〈σk〉k∈[ℓ]))
then return 1
else return 0
Figure 4.3: Experiment for proving result authenticity against server adversaries
is invoked with the public verification key 〈p,G1,G2, g, e, h〉 of the BLS signature and and file
ciphertexts 〈sk, bk〉k∈[ℓ]. S2 can then invoke clientOr first with a Paillier public key pek and an
integer ℓ (as in m301) and receives n and θ in response (as in m302). S2 can then invoke clientOr ℓ
times, each time with ciphertexts α, ρ and Ψk (as inm303), and receives ciphertexts 〈µij〉i∈[n],j∈[m],
and bk in response (as in m304). Finally, S2 outputs a ring element γ
∗ as in m306. The experiment
outputs 1 if and only if γ∗ ∈ π(Q) and γ∗ 6= π(M(〈σk〉k∈[ℓ])), where π is a random injection that
was given to clientOr as input so that it will not need to select one by itself as in c303. This means
that the protocol outputs an erroneous final state to the client and goes undetected by the client. For
an arbitrarily malicious server adversary S, we define its advantage as:
Advs-authΠ3(E) (S) = P
(
Expts-authΠ3(E) (S) = 1
)
and defineAdvs-authΠ3(E) (t, ℓ, n,m, h1, h2) = maxS Adv
s-auth
Π3(E)
(S) where the maximum is taken over
all adversaries S executing in time t and selecting a file of length ℓ and a DFA of n states and
alphabet of sizem and making h1 hash queries to H1(·) and h2 queries to H2(·).
We reduce the result authenticity against a server adversary to the bilinear computational Diffie-
Hellman problem (BCDH) [18]. The BCDH problem is defined using the experiment in Fig. 4.4, in
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which an adversary A is given two bilinear groups G1 and G2 both of order p, a random generator
g of G1 and g
z1 , gz2 , gz3 where z1, z2, z3
$← Z∗p. The experiment outputs 1 if and only if A is able





and then Advbcdh(t) = maxAAdv
bcdh(A) where the maximum is taken over all adversaries A
executing in time t.
Experiment Exptbcdh(A)
(p,G1,G2, g, e) ← ParamGen(1κ)
z1, z2, z3
$← Z∗p
v ← A(p,G1,G2, g, e, gz1 , gz2 , gz3)
if v = e(g, g)z1z2z3
then return 1
else return 0
Figure 4.4: Experiment for defining BCDH problem
We now prove that the protocol guarantees the authenticity of the evaluation result against an
arbitrarily malicious server adversary.
Theorem 6. Let H1(·) and H2(·) be random oracles. For t1 = t + tParamGen + tBLSKeyGen + tGen +
ℓ · (tBLSSign + tEnc) and t2 = t + 2 · tGen + ℓ · (tBLSSign + tEnc)
Advs-authΠ3(E) (t, ℓ, n,m, h1, h2) ≤ Adv
ind-cpa
E (t1, ℓ+ 1) + (m− 1) · ℓ · h2 ·Advbcdh(t2)
Proof. Given a server adversary S, there are essentially two avenues by which a S might attempt to
misbehave while escaping detection. The first is to create τ(σ, k, βk , ψk) = H2(e(H1(σ||k)βkψk , h))
for some σ 6= σk, and to use τ(σ, k, βk , ψk) as η in the protocol. The second is to cause the client to
execute a state transition into an erroneous state in Q without computing τ(σ, k, βk , ψk) for some
σ 6= σk. Let event1 denote the fact that the former event happens, and ¬event1 denote that the latter
case happens. We prove in Lemma 1 that ¬event1 can only happen in probability negligible with
respect to the security parameter. Here we show that the occurrence of event1 implies the ability to
solve the BCDH problem.
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Given an adversary S = (S1, S2) for which event1 happens, and that runs in time t, produces
a file of length ℓ, and produces a DFA of n states over an alphabet of m symbols, while making
h1 and h2 hash queries to H1(·) and H2(·) respectively, we construct a BCDH attacker A to at-




On input two bilinear groups G1 and G2 both of order p, a random generator g of G1 and Z1 =
gz1 , Z2 = g
z2 , Z3 = g
z3 where z1, z2, z3
$← Z∗p, A generates two public/private key pairs (ek , dk)
and (ek ′, dk ′) for an IND-CPA encryption scheme and then invokes S1(〈p,G1,G2, g, e, Z1〉, ek)
to obtain (ℓ, 〈σk〉k∈[ℓ],M, φ). Let |M.Q| = n and |M.Σ| = m. A then sets H1(σk||k) ← guk
where uk
$← Z∗p and then computes the encrypted file sequence 〈sk, bk〉k∈[ℓ] such that sk ←
Zukβk1 for βk
$← Z∗p and bk ← Encek (βk). Note that the file ciphertext 〈sk, bk〉k∈[ℓ] is well
formed because e(sk, g) = e(Z
ukβk
1 , g) = e(g
z1ukβk , g) = e(g, g)z1ukβk = e(guk , gz1)βk =
e(H1(σk||k), Z1)βk , as in the real protocol. A then chooses k∗ $← [ℓ] and σ∗ $← Σ \ {σk∗} as
its guesses on the round k∗ and the input symbol σ∗ that S2 will attempt forgery. Finally, A invokes
S2(〈p,G1,G2, g, e, Z1〉,M.Σ, 〈sk, bk〉k∈[ℓ]) and simulates responses to S2’s queries to clientOr as
follows.
After receiving pek and ℓ from S2 (m301), A sets θ ← Encek ′(π′), π′ $← Injs(Q → R) and
sends n and θ to S2 (as in m302). In round k ∈ [ℓ], A sets α ← Encpek (r), r $← ZN and sets
ρ← Encek(0). If k 6= k∗, then A generates the random challenge Ψk exactly as specified in c310–
c311. If k = k∗, then A sets Ψk ← Z3. In either case, A then sends α, ρ and Ψk to S2 (m303).
After ℓ such rounds, A computes α to be the ciphertext of a random element of R, and sends it to S
(m305).
Meanwhile, A answers S2’s queries to the random oracle H1(·) as follows. For any query that
was previously posed to H1,A returns the value returned to that previous query, and for new queries,
A generates a return value as follows. If the query is σ∗||k∗, then A returns Z2. For all other queries,
A picks u
$← Z∗p and returns gu. For S2’s queries to H2(·), for any query that was previously posed
to H2, A returns the value returned to that previous query. For new queries, A picks r
$← ZN and
returns r to S2.
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If S2 computes











mod p. The probability that A outputs e(g, g)z1z2z3 is then 1(m−1)·ℓ·h2 times the probability that














Sims-authΠ3(E) (S) = 1 | ¬event1
)
· P (¬event1)
We prove in Lemma 1 that P (¬event1) is negligible as a function of the security parameter. So,





(m− 1) · ℓ · h2 · P
(
Sims-authΠ3(E) (S) = 1
)
(4.4)
The only difference between the above described Sims-authΠ3(E) (S) and Expt
s-auth
Π3(E)
(S) is the way
that θ and ρ are created. To show that this difference does not affect S’s ability to succeed in its
attack, we reduce its ability to distinguish Sims-authΠ3(E) (S) fromExpt
s-auth
Π3(E)
(S) to the IND-CPA secu-
rity of the encryption scheme from which ek ′ is generated. We create an IND-CPA adversary U that,
on input pˆk of an encryption scheme E ′, uses his encryption oracle to select between Sims-authΠ3(E) (S)
and Expts-authΠ3(E) (S) by setting θ ← Encbˆpˆk (π′, π) as in c304 and ρ← Encbˆpˆk (0, r) as in c307. Aside
from this, U performs the simulation exactly the same as described above for A. U returns bˆ′ = 1 if
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S2 succeeds in its attack and returns bˆ
′ = 0 otherwise. So we have,
Adv
ind-cpa







































Substituting in Eqn. 4.4, we have:
Adv
ind-cpa
E (U) ≥ Advs-authΠ3(E) (S)− (m− 1) · ℓ · h2 ·Advbcdh(A)
thus completing the proof. U takes time t1 = t+ tParamGen+ tBLSKeyGen+ tGen+ℓ ·(tBLSSign+ tEnc)
due to the need to generate a BLS signing key, the encryption key (ek , dk) and to encrypt ℓ file
characters. U also needs to make ℓ+ 1 encryption oracle queries. A takes time t2 = t + 2 · tGen +
ℓ · (tBLSSign + tEnc) due to the need to generate both (ek , dk) and (ek ′, dk ′) and to encrypt ℓ file
characters.
Lemma 1. Let H2 be a random oracle, and let S2 be a server-compromising adversary. If in no
round k does S2 compute τ(σ, k, βk, ψk) for some σ 6= σk, then the client outputs an incorrect
state q ∈ Q with probability at most negligibly more than n−1N .
Proof. In round k, the client transitions to the next DFA state by encoding the DFA transition
function using a polynomial f satisfying f(π(q) +
R
ϕk, τ(σ, k, βk, ψk)) = π(δ(q, σ)) for every
q ∈ Q and σ ∈ Σ; let f(x, y) = R∑n−1i=0 R∑m−1j=0 aij ·R xi ·R yj . To cause a state transition to an
erroneous state q′ ∈ Q, a server adversary must therefore produce ciphertexts 〈µij〉i∈[n],j∈[m] with







aij ·R νij (4.6)
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without having any information about the injection π or τ(σ, k, βk, ψk) for any σ 6= σk (since H2 is a
random oracle). Note that the distribution of 〈aij〉i∈[n],j∈[m] is not independent of the DFA transition
function δ and the injection π. That is, once π is fixed, only certain values for 〈aij〉i∈[n],j∈[m] are
possible.
We argue the result under the conservative assumption that δ and π uniquely determine 〈aij〉i∈[n],j∈[m]
(which in general they do not). Even then, for any i′ ∈ [n] and j′ ∈ [m] such that ai′j′ 6= 0 and
gcd(ai′j′ , N) = 1 (lines c314–c315 abort the protocol if gcd(aij , N) > 1 for some aij 6= 0), and for
any choices of 〈νij〉i∈[n],j∈[m] excepting νi′j′ , there is exactly one value for νi′j′ in ZN that satisfies
Eqn. 4.6. Moreover, prior to the last message sent by the client (m305), the random injection π is
hidden information theoretically from S2, and so π(q) for each q ∈ Q is uniformly distributed from
S2’s perspective. So, the probability S2 succeeds in selecting 〈νij〉i∈[n],j∈[m] to satisfy Eqn. 4.6 is
1
N , and since there are n − 1 possible erroneous states q′, the probability S succeeds in causing an
erroneous state transition to any q′ ∈ Q is at most n−1N .
Finally, while the server learns π(q) for one q ∈ Q in the last client-to-server message (m305)
— if it behaved thus far — it does so only for the correct state q at this point. Again, it can then
guess π(q′) for an incorrect q′ ∈ Q to return as γ∗ with probability only n−1N .
4.2.6 Security Against Client Adversaries
In this section we show security of Π3(E) against honest-but-curious client adversaries. Since
the client has the DFA in its possession, privacy of the DFA against a client adversary is not a
concern. Therefore we only focus on the privacy of the file. However, by the nature of what the
protocol computes for the client — i.e., the final state of a DFA match on the file — the client
can easily distinguish two files of its choosing simply by running the protocol correctly using a
DFA that distinguishes between the two files it chose. For this reason, we adapt the notion of
indistinguishability to apply only to files that produce the same final state for the client’s DFA. So, in
the experimentExptc-fileΠ3(E) (Fig. 4.5) that we use to define file security against client adversaries, the
adversary C = (C1, C2) succeeds (i.e.,Expt
c-file
Π3(E)
(C) returns 1) only if the two files 〈σ0k〉k∈[ℓ] and
〈σ1k〉k∈[ℓ] output by C1 both drive the DFAM, also output by C1, to the same final state (denoted
M(〈σ0k〉k∈[ℓ]) = M(〈σ1k〉k∈[ℓ])). Otherwise, the experiment is straightforward: C1 receives the
BLS signature verification key vk, a private decryption key dk and a public key ek ′, and returns
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Experiment Exptc-fileΠ3(E) (C1, C2)
(p,G1,G2, g, e) ← ParamGen(1κ)
(〈p,G1,G2, g, e, h〉, 〈G1 , x〉) ← BLSKeyGen(p,G1,G2, g, e)
vk ← 〈p,G1,G2, g, e, h〉
(ek , dk )← Gen(1κ)
(ek ′, dk ′) ← Gen(1κ+2)
(ℓ, 〈σ0k〉k∈[ℓ], 〈σ1k〉k∈[ℓ],M, φ) ← C1(vk, dk , ek ′)
if M(〈σ0k〉k∈[ℓ]) 6= M(〈σ1k〉k∈[ℓ]) then return 0
b
$← {0, 1}





bk ← Encek (βk)
b′ ← CserverOr(vk,M.Σ,〈sk,bk〉k∈[ℓ])2 (φ, vk, dk , ek ′,M)
if b′ = b
then return 1
else return 0
Figure 4.5: Experiment for proving file privacy against client adversaries
the two ℓ-symbol files (for ℓ of its choosing) 〈σ0k〉k∈[ℓ] and 〈σ1k〉k∈[ℓ] and a DFA M. Depending
on how b is then chosen, one of these files is encrypted and then provided to the server. C2 is then
invoked with vk, dk , ek ′ andM, and oracle access to serverOr(vk,M.Σ, 〈sk , bk〉k∈[ℓ]).
serverOr then responds to C2’s queries as follows, ignoring malformed queries. The first query
(could be simply “start”) initiates serverOr to begin the protocol. serverOr responds first with a
Paillier public key pek and an integer ℓ (as in m301), to which serverOr returns n and θ (as in
m302). C2 can then invoke serverOr up to ℓ+ 1 times. The first ℓ such invocations take the form α,
ρ, Ψk and correspond to messages of the form m303. For each such invocation, serverOr responds
with 〈µσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[n] and bk (i.e., of the formm304). The last C2’s invocation contains one ciphertext
α corresponding to m305. This invocation elicits a response γ∗ (i.e., m306). Malformed or extra
queries are rejected by serverOr.
We prove file privacy against honest-but-curious client adversaries C = (C1, C2), i.e., C2
invokes serverOr exactly as Π3(E) prescribes, using DFAM output by C1. We define the advantage
of C to be hbcAdvc-fileΠ3(E) (C) = 2 · P
(
Exptc-fileΠ3(E) (C) = 1
)




(C) where the maximum is taken over honest-but-curious client adversaries C
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running in total time t and producing files of length ℓ and a DFA of n states over an alphabet of m
symbols. We now prove:
Theorem 7. For t′ = t + tParamGen + tBLSKeyGen +2 · tGen + ℓ ∗ (tBLSSign + tEnc) + (ℓ+ 1) · tDec ,




Proof. Given an adversary C = (C1, C2) running in time t and selecting files of length ℓ and
a DFA of n states over an alphabet of m symbols, we construct an IND-CPA adversary U that
demonstrates the theorem as follows. On input a Paillier public key pˆk = 〈N, g〉, U sets pek ←
pˆk and generates (p,G1,G2, g, e) ← ParamGen(1κ) and (vk ← 〈p,G1,G2, g, e, h〉, 〈G1 , x〉) ←
BLSKeyGen(p,G1,G2, g, e). U also sets (ek , dk ) ← Gen(1κ) and (ek ′, dk ′) ← Gen(1κ+2) , and
then invokes C1(vk, dk , ek
′) to obtain (ℓ, 〈σ0k〉k∈[ℓ], 〈σ1k〉k∈[ℓ], M, φ), where M = 〈Q, Σ, qinit,
δ〉 is a DFA. For each k ∈ [ℓ], U computes s0k ← H1(σ0k||k)x·βk for βk $← Z∗p, and sets
b0k ← Encek(βk). Similarly, U sets s1k ← H1(σ1k||k)x·βk and sets b1k ← Encek (βk). Note that
the same βk is assigned to both s0k and s1k, thus resulting in b0k and b1k encrypting the same
plaintext value.
U then invokes C2(φ, vk, dk , ek
′,M) and simulates responses to C2’s queries to serverOr as
follows (ignoring malformed invocations). In response to the initial “start” query fromC1, U returns
pˆk and ℓ and gets n and θ in return. U decrypts the ciphertext θ and sets π ← Decdk ′(θ). U sets
m← |M.Σ| and in preparation for the subsequent serverOr invocations by C2, U sets q0 ←M.qinit
and q1 ←M.qinit. For the k-th query of the form α, ρ,Ψk (0 ≤ k < ℓ), the adversary U sets ϕk ←
Decdk ′(ρ), γ0 ← π(q0) +R ϕk, and γ1 ← π(q1) +R ϕk. U computes η0 ← H2(e(s0k,Ψk)), and
η1 ← H2(e(s1k,Ψk)) exactly as done in s306 and then sets µij ← Encbˆpˆk ((γ0)i·R(η0)j , (γ1)i·R(η1)j)
for i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]. After this, U updates q0 ← δ(q0, σ0k) and q1 ← δ(q1, σ1k), and returns
〈µij〉i∈[n],j∈[m] and b0k (= b1k) to C2. For the last query α, adversary U returns γ∗ = π(q0) to C2.
When C2 outputs b
′, U outputs b′, as well.
This simulation is distributed identically with the real system provided that C is honest-but-
curious, and so ignoring terms that are negligible in κ, hbcAdvc-fileΠ3(Pai)(C) = Adv
ind-cpa
Pai (U).
Note that U runs in t′ = t+ tParamGen+ tBLSKeyGen+2 · tGen+ ℓ ∗ (tBLSSign + tEnc)+ (ℓ+1) · tDec
where 2 · tGen, due to the need to generate a BLS signing key, to generate (ek , dk) and (ek ′, dk ′),
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and to encrypt ℓ file characters, and to perform one decryption of a ciphertext produced by ek ′ in
each round. U makes nm oracle queries in order to respond to each of the ℓ oracle queries following
the first.
4.3 On File Updates
Protocol Π3(E) is presented for a static file, and so in this section we consider the impact of file
updates. As we discuss below, these impacts are nontrivial, and so our protocol is arguably most
useful for static files.
To enable protocol Π3(E), the data owner signs the file position k along with σk when producing
sk to detect the server reordering file characters, i.e., sk ← H1(σ||k)x·βk where βk $← Z∗p. Such
a representation would require any character insertion or deletion at position k to further require
updating the signature sk′ for all k
′ > k. If the total file length ℓ is also included as an input to
H1 to detect file truncation, then insertions and deletions may require updating the signatures sk′
for all k′ < k, as well. This latter cost can be eliminated by not including ℓ as an input to H1 but
rather to have the data owner sign ℓ and the server to forward this signature along with ℓ to the
client in message m301. The former cost can be mitigated somewhat by breaking each file into
blocks (essentially smaller files) so that insertions and deletions require only the affected blocks to
be rewritten. In this case, the block index within the file should presumably also be included as an
input to H1 to detect block reorderings by the server.
Even with these modifications, there remain other complexities in handling file updates, in
that a server could simply use a stale version of the file when performing protocol Π3(E) with the
client, ignoring any earlier updates to the file by the data owner. Detecting a server that selectively
suppresses updates seems to require additional interaction between the data owner and the client
and has been the subject of much study (for file stores subject to reads and updates only) under
the banner of fork consistency [55]. We leave as future work the integration of our DFA evaluation
techniques with these ideas, i.e., so that DFA evaluations performed against stale files are efficiently
detected when the client subsequently interacts with the data owner.
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4.4 Extensions
The protocol Π3(E) can be extended in various ways that may be of interest and that we will
discuss here. The first “extension” is simply the removal of the file encryption step described in
Section 4.2.3, which is suitable for the standard two-party model where the server’s input need not
be kept secret from the server himself. This simplification eliminates the dk , βk and bk values from
the protocol, implicitly setting βk = 1.
A more interesting variant of the protocol addresses the concern that the protocol as stated in
Fig. 4.1 discloses the decryption key dk and the values 〈βk〉k∈[ℓ] to the client, either of which can be
used to decrypt the file from its ciphertext 〈sk, bk〉k∈[ℓ]. While this file ciphertext is not disclosed to
the client during the protocol, it seems unnecessarily permissive to disclose its decryption key to ev-
ery client that performs a DFA evaluation on the file: if the file ciphertext were ever unintentionally
disclosed, then any such client could decrypt the file if it retained the key. In the rest of this section
we discuss an extension to the protocol in Fig. 4.1 to avoid disclosing dk and the values 〈βk〉k∈[ℓ] to
the client.
In order to avoid disclosing dk to the client, one alternative is for the data owner to provide
shares of dk to both the client and the server, so as to enable a two-party decryption of each bk. Then,
rather than sending only bk to the client in message m304, the server can also send its contribution
to the decryption of bk, enabling the client to complete the decryption of bk without learning dk
itself.
Still, however, this alternative would disclose βk to the client, which would enable it to deter-
mine σk if sk were ever disclosed. To avoid disclosing βk, one strategy is for the server to first
blind βk with another random value tk, i.e., to execute the protocol with βktk in place of just βk. Of
course, this factor tk would also then need to be reflected in k-th file character used in the protocol,
i.e., so the server would use stkk = H1(σk||k)xβktk in place of sk in the protocol. Because the server
does not have access to βk but rather has access only to its ciphertext bk, it is necessary that the
encryption scheme used to construct bk enable the computation of a ciphertext bˆk from bk and tk
such that Decdk (bˆk) = βktk mod N
′ for some value N ′ such that p | N ′. In this case, selecting
tk
$← ZN ′ suffices to ensure that βktk mod N ′ is distributed independently of βk and so hides βk
from the client when it learns βktk mod N
′.
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An encryption scheme meeting our requirements (supporting two-party decryption and homo-
morphism on ciphertexts) is ElGamal encryption [30] in a subgroup of Z∗N ′ . However, note that
setting N ′ = p is inefficient: the security parameter κ and so the size of p required for security is
an order of magnitude less for BLS signing than it would be for ElGamal encryption in a subgroup
of Z∗p [52], and so setting N
′ = p would add considerable expense to the protocol. As such, a more
efficient construction would be to choose N ′ = pp′ for another prime p′. ElGamal encryption is
believed to be secure with a composite modulus even if its factorization is known [14].
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CHAPTER 5
Toward Practical Encrypted Email That Supports
Private, Regular-Expression Searches
In this chapter, we prototype a system to perform private regular expression searches on en-
crypted emails and evaluate its performance. Toward this goal, we develop new protocols to enable
private regular expression searches on encrypted data stored at a server. The novelty of the protocol
lies in allowing a user to securely delegate an encrypted regular-expression search query to a proxy,
which interacts with the server where user’s data is stored encrypted to produce the search result for
the user. The privacy of the query and the data are both provably protected against an arbitrarily
malicious server and a partially trusted proxy under rigorous security definitions. We then develop
a working implementation of this protocol together with several optimizations to make it perform
well and then evaluate the performance of this implementation on a real-world email data set. We
describe our initial protocol design in Section 5.1 and detail a series of optimizations we employed
in Section 5.2, and finally present the implementation and its performance evaluation in Section 5.4.
5.1 Protocol Design
In this chapter, we define a deterministic finite automaton M to be a tuple 〈Q, Σ, δ, qinit, ∆〉
where Q is a set of |Q| = n states; Σ is a set (alphabet) of |Σ| = m symbols; δ : Q × Σ → Q
is a transition function; and qinit is the initial state; and ∆ : Q → {0, 1} is a function for which
∆(q) = 1 indicates that q is an accepting state.
client(pk , sk1, 〈Q,Σ, δ, qinit,∆〉) server(pk , sk 2,Σ, 〈ckj〉k∈[ℓ],j∈[m])
c401. n← |Q|,m← |Σ| s401. m← |Σ|
c402. π0 ← I s402. 〈λσj〉σ∈Σ,j∈[m]
c403. π1
$← Injs(Q→ R) ← Lagrange(Σ)







c405. for k ← 0 . . . ℓ− 1 s403. for k ← 0 . . . ℓ− 1




s404. γ ← Dec2sk2(α, β)
c407. π0 ← π1 s405. for σ ∈ Σ
c408. π1




c409. δ′ ← Blind(δ, π0, π1) s407. for i ∈ [n]
c410. 〈aσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[n] s408. µσi ← γi ·pk Ψσ












c412. endfor s411. endfor




c414. π0 ← π1 s412. γ ← Dec2sk2(α, β)
c415. π1
$←Injs({0,1} → {0,1}) s413. for i ∈ [n]
c416. ∆′ ← Blind(∆, π0, π1) s414. µi ← Encpk (γi)

















c420. return π−11 (θ)
Figure 5.1: Protocol Π
′
1(E), described in Section 5.1.1
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5.1.1 Our Starting Point
Our starting point is the protocol Π1(E) that we built in Chapter 3. The goal of the protocol is to
enable a client having a DFAM as input to interact with a server storing the ciphertext and a file to
obtain the result as thoughM was evaluated on the file plaintext. We first modify the protocol Π1(E)
so that at the end only a binary answer is returned to the client, as opposed to the final state of the
evaluation as originally designed. More precisely, the client should output a bit indicating whether
the final state to which the file plaintext drives the DFA is accepting or not; i.e., if the plaintext of
the file is a sequence 〈σk〉k∈[ℓ] where [ℓ] denotes the set {0, 1, . . . , ℓ − 1} and where each σk ∈ Σ,
then the client should output ∆(δ(. . . δ(δ(qinit, σ0), σ1), . . . , σℓ−1)). We also permit the client to
learn the file length ℓ and the server to learn both ℓ and the number of states n in the client’s DFA.
The client should learn nothing else about the file, however, and the server should learn nothing else
about the file or the client’s DFA.
We show the modified protocol Π
′
1(E) in Fig. 5.1. It follows Π1(E) in Fig. 3.1 except for the
additional two rounds of interaction (m405-m408) at the end in order to obtain a binary answer
of whether the final state is an accepting state or not. For that purpose, the client creates another
polynomial F (x) = R
∑n−1
i=0 zi ·R xi such that F (q) = 1 if and only if ∆(q) = 1 and F (q) = 0
otherwise. That is, F (x) “converges” all accepting states to 1 and all non-accepting states to 0.
Since the client needs help from the server to decrypt the final result (s416), it applies another
random injection π1
$← Injs({0, 1} → {0, 1}) on the output of the function ∆ to hide the results
from the server. In the protocol, we use∆′ ← Blind(∆, π0, π1) (c416) to denote the step to generate
the blinded function that maps the accepting state to a random number between 0 and 1. The client
then uses the polynomial interpolation procedure to obtain the coefficients of F (x) in c417. After
“evaluating” F (x) in c418 and obtaining the encrypted binary output Θ, the client interacts with the
server one last time to decrypt it and returns the final result in c420.
5.1.2 Our Initial Construction
Starting from the protocol of the previous section, we develop a protocol in this section that
replaces the client with two parties: a user that holds the the DFA 〈Q, Σ, δ, qinit, ∆〉 and a proxy
that the user invokes to conduct a protocol to evaluate this DFA on a file stored at the server. Notably,
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the protocol we develop here protects the secrecy of the DFA 〈Q, Σ, δ, qinit, ∆〉 and the evaluation
result from the proxy, and so this modification enables the proxy to execute the protocol on behalf
of others who do not trust it with knowledge of the DFA. One scenario in which this protection
is desirable is if the user does not have the bandwidth or processing available for performing the
evaluation herself.
The protocol, denoted Π4(E), protects the DFA privacy by giving to the proxy the encryptions
of the coefficients of the DFA polynomial f, denoted 〈aˆσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[n] where aˆσi ← Encpk (aσi) and
〈aσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[n] ← ToPoly(Q,Σ, δ), and the encryptions of the coefficients of the converging polyno-
mial F , i.e., 〈zˆi〉i∈[n] where zˆi ← Encpk (zi) and 〈zˆi〉i∈[n] ← ToPoly(Q,Σ,∆). The implications of
this change to the protocol are far-reaching, due to the operations that the proxy needs to perform
using these now-encrypted coefficients.
In the original protocol, in order to hide the current state transition from the server, the client
blinds the current transition state by choosing a random injection π1 of the state encodings in each
round so that the server obtains a random ring element γ in s404 every time. A new DFA polynomial
is then interpolated to accommodate the injections chosen in the last and current round (c407–c410)
to continue state transitions consistently. When the coefficients are encrypted, however, the proxy
will not be able to interpolate new polynomials because it does not have access to δ. We thus need
another strategy to achieve these “blinding” and “unblinding” effects. Rather than blinding with a
random injection, the new protocol does so by additively adding in a random ring element r to the
ciphertext representing the current state (c503–c504). The consequence of this additive blinding
operation is that the proxy needs a way to “shift” f (and its encrypted coefficients) to produce a
polynomial f ′(x, y) satisfying f ′(q +
R
r, σ) = δ(q, σ) for each q ∈ Q and σ ∈ Σ, for a specified
r ∈ R. We observe that if we set




f ′σ(x) ·R Λσ(y)
)
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σi ·R xi, then it suffices if f ′σ(x+R r) = fσ(x) for all σ ∈ Σ. Note that
fσ(x−R r) = R
n−1∑
i=0



























































ensures f ′σ(x +R r) = fσ(x) and, therefore, f(x +R r, σ) = f
′(x, σ). When the proxy has access

















In our pseudocode, we encapsulate calculations (Eqn. 5.3) in the invocation 〈aˆ′σi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[n]← Shift(r,
〈aˆσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[n]).
Now that the coefficients are encrypted, the operation by the client to combine coefficients with
ciphertexts as was done in line c411 in Fig. 5.1 no longer works for the proxy. For this reason, we
need to expand the properties we require of the encryption system we use, to include the ability to
homomorphically “multiply” ciphertexts once. We emphasize that we do not require fully homomor-
phic encryption. Our construction can be instantiated with any additively homomorphic encryption
scheme that allows a single homomorphic multiplication of two ciphertexts (e.g., [17, 34]), pro-
vided that it also supports two-party decryption. Here we build from the more well-studied scheme
of Boneh, Goh and Nissim [17], which we denote by BGN.
Encryption scheme Specifically, BGN uses an algorithm BGNInit that, on input 1κ, outputs (p, p′,
G, G′, e) where p, p′ are random κ/2-bit primes, G and G′ are cyclic groups of order N = pp′, and
e : G×G→ G′ is a bilinear map. In this encryption scheme, the ring R is ZN , the ciphertext space
C〈N,G,G′,e,g,h,gˆ〉 is G ∪G′, and the relevant algorithms are defined as follows. Note that we assume
that elements of G and G′ are encoded distinctly.
Gen(1κ): Generate (p, p′,G,G′, e) ← BGNInit(1κ); select random generators g, u $← G; set
N ← pp′, h ← up′ , and gˆ ← e(g, g)p; and return public key 〈N,G,G′, e, g, h, gˆ〉 and private key
〈N , G, G′, e, g, gˆ, p〉.
Enc〈N,G,G′,e,g,h,gˆ〉(m): Select x
$← ZN and return gmhx.
Dec〈N,G,G′,e,g,gˆ,p〉(c): If c ∈ G, then return the discrete logarithm of e(c, g)p with respect to base gˆ.
If c ∈ G′, then return the discrete logarithm of cp with respect to base gˆ.
c1 +〈N,G,G′,e,g,h,gˆ〉 c2: If c1 and c2 are in the same group (i.e., both are in G or both are in G
′), then
return c1c2. Otherwise, if c1 ∈ G and c2 ∈ G′, then return e(c1, g)c2.
m ·〈N,G,G′,e,g,h,gˆ〉 c: Return cm .
c1 ⊙〈N,G,G′,e,g,h,gˆ〉 c2: If c1, c2 ∈ G, then return e(c1, c2). Otherwise, return ⊥.
Share(〈N,G,G′, e, g, gˆ, p〉): Return sk1 = 〈G,G′, d1〉 and sk2 = 〈G,G′, e, g, gˆ, d2〉 where d1 $←
ZN and d2 ← p− d1 mod N .
Dec1〈G,G′,d1〉(c): Return c
d1 .
Dec2〈G,G′,e,g,gˆ,d2〉(c1, c2): If c1, c2 ∈ G, then return the discrete logarithm of e(c2cd21 , g) with respect
to base gˆ. If c1, c2 ∈ G′, then return the discrete logarithm of c2cd21 with respect to base gˆ.
Note the new operator ⊙pk that homomorphically multiplies two ciphertexts in G. Since the result
is in G′, it is not possible to use the result as an argument to ⊙pk . This is the sense in which this
scheme permits homomorphic multiplication “once”. Also note that though the basic scheme of
Boneh et al. did not include gˆ = e(g, g)p in the public key, Boneh et al. proposed an extension
supporting multiparty threshold decryption [17, Section 5] that did so1; it is this extension that we
adopt here.
A complication of using BGN is the need to compute a discrete logarithm to decrypt inDec〈N,G,G′,e,g,gˆ,p〉
andDec2〈G,G′,e,g,gˆ,d2〉. We thus need to design our protocol so that any ciphertext that a party attempts
to decrypt should hold a plaintext from a small range 0 . . . L. Then, Pollard’s lambda method [56, p.
1The exact construction supporting threshold decryption was left implicit by Boneh et al. [17], but we have confirmed
that including gˆ = e(g, g)p in the public key is what they intended [15].
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128] enables recovery of the plaintext in O(
√
L) time. Alternatively, a precomputed table that maps
gˆm to the plaintext m ∈ {0 . . . L} enables decryption to be performed by table lookup.
proxy(pk , sk1,Σ, n, αinit server(pk , sk2,Σ,
〈aˆσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[n], 〈zˆi〉i∈[n]) 〈ckj〉k∈[ℓ],j∈[m])









c502. for k ← 0 . . . ℓ− 1 s503. for k ← 0 . . . ℓ− 1
c503. r
$← {0, 1}κ′
c504. α← α+pk Encpk (r)




s504. γ ← Dec2sk2(α, β)
s505. for σ ∈ Σ




c506. 〈aˆ′σi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[n] s507. for i ∈ [n]













c508. endfor s511. endfor
c509. r
$← {0, 1}κ′
c510. α← α+pk Encpk (r)




s512. γ ← Dec2sk2(α, β)
c512. 〈zˆi′〉i∈[n] s513. for i ∈ [n]











Figure 5.2: Protocol Π4(E), described in Section 5.1.2
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Protocol steps Protocol Π4(E) is shown in Fig. 5.2. It has a similar structure to Π1(E), but differs
in many respects.
• Rather than taking 〈Q, Σ, δ, qinit, ∆〉 as input, the proxy takes αinit ← Encpk (qinit) and
encrypted coefficients 〈aˆσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[n] and 〈zˆi〉i∈[n] as input. Fig. 5.2 presumes that these
coefficients are created by performing 〈aσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[n] ← ToPoly(Q,Σ, δ) and 〈zi〉i∈[n] ←
ToPoly(Q,Σ,∆) and then encrypting each coefficient using pk , i.e., aˆσi ← Encpk (aσi) for
each σ ∈ Σ and i ∈ [n], and zˆi ← Encpk (zi) for each i ∈ [n].
• Because server decrypts the (blinded) DFA state in line s504, the plaintext should be ade-
quately small so that decryption — which as discussed above, involves computing (or looking
up) a discrete logarithm if BGN encryption is in use — is not too costly. For this reason, and
assuming R = ZN (as it is in BGN) and Q = [n], the blinding term r is drawn from {0, 1}κ′
instead of R, where κ′ ≪ κ is another security parameter. Then, the statistical distance be-
tween the distribution of γ seen by server in line s504 when the blinded state is q (i.e., when
γ = q +
R




P(q + r = x | r $← {0, 1}κ′ )















Since q ∈ [n], we anticipate setting κ′ ≈ log2 n+15 to achieve a reasonable balance between
decryption cost and security for moderately sized n. It is important to note, however, that
generally κ′ will need to grow with n (though only logarithmically so).
• The fact that each aˆσi is a ciphertext necessitates using the “one-time multiplication” operator
⊙pk in line c507 to produce the ciphertext of the new state, versus ·pk as in line c411. The
same is true for each zˆi in c513.
• The protocol returns an encrypted evaluation result Θ to the proxy (c514), and so the original
round to decrypt the result (m407–m408) is omitted.
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Protocol security We are able to proveΠ4(E) protects DFA privacy and file content privacy against
arbitrarily malicious server adversaries, and DFA privacy and file privacy against honest-but-curious
proxy adversaries. We do not present the proofs here, but in the next section we develop an optimized
protocol that has better efficiency and achieves similar security properties. We will formally define
the security notions and prove that protocol secure in Section 5.3.
5.2 Optimizations
In this section, we detail a series of optimizations that we developed for our protocol that, in
our implementation, achieved an order of magnitude improvement in performance.
5.2.1 File Representation
We first observe that, in protocol Π4(E), the computation done by the server in s506 using
the Lagrange coefficients it computed in s502 is effectively evaluating the ciphertext of Λσ(σk) for
each σ ∈ Σ, using the values 〈ckj〉j∈[m] provided as input to the server where ckj ← Encpk ((σk)j).
Recall that only for σ = σk does Λσ(σk) = 1; otherwise, Λσ(σk) = 0. Since this calculation only
depends on the ciphertexts of the current file character, the result of it, i.e., 〈Encpk (Λσ(σk))〉σ∈Σ,
could have been provided by the data owner as the ciphertext of file character σk so that the server
would not need to compute it itself.
With this observation, our first optimization is to eliminate the use of the Lagrange polyno-
mial Λσ(y) completely and decompose the original bivariate polynomial f(x, y) to m univariate
polynomials fσ(x) for each σ ∈ Σ. The encryption of a file character σk now becomes a vector
of encryptions of 0’s and one 1. Specifically, σk is provided to the server as ciphertexts 〈ckσ〉σ∈Σ
where ckσ ← Encpk (1) if σ = σk and ckσ ← Encpk (0) otherwise. This representation has the
same storage costs per file character as the original protocol, i.e., m ciphertexts per encrypted file
character.
5.2.2 Pairing Operations
During the implementation of our protocol, we noticed that the pairing operations performed
by the proxy in c507 are very costly and became the bottleneck of the overall performance. Accel-
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erating pairing operations is a research area of substantial interest and any progress made would
be beneficial to protocols such as ours that utilize pairing. Our focus here, however, is twofold.
One is to adapt the protocol to reduce the number of pairing operations. In particular, mn pairing
operations are needed in c507 in each round. In this section, we redesign the protocol to reduce the
number of pairing operation down to m. The other focus is to make the protocol design amenable
to pairing preprocessing [53].
Informally, given a bilinear map e : G × G → G′, if it is known in advance that a particular
value c ∈ G will be paired with other elements multiple times, then preprocessing on c can be
performed in advance to achieve a significant reduction in pairing time. For example, for the class
of machines used in our experiments in Section 5.4, a pairing operation for a 1024-bit BGN scheme
costs around 35ms without preprocessing but only 10ms after preprocessing. In c507, the pairing
operation performed is e(aˆ′σi, µσi). Unfortunately, both aˆ
′
σi and µσi change in each round, which
prohibits preprocessing. This suggests that performing pairing operations on the proxy side may not
be the best choice in terms of the potential for optimization.
We therefore redesigned the protocol with the goals of reducing the number of pairing opera-
tions and making pairing preprocessing possible. Fortunately, we were able to achieve both goals by
shifting the pairing operations to the server side. The resulting protocol Π5(E) is shown in Fig. 5.3.
The new protocol essentially switches the roles of the proxy and server (though not entirely, since
each still receives the same inputs). Note that the directions of the messages m603 and m604 are
reversed from those in Fig. 5.2. The values α and β, which used to be produced by the proxy in
c504 and c505, are now produced by the server in s604 and s605. This role reversal imposes some
significant changes in the computations done by the proxy and server.
We now describe the changes made in the protocol. We ask the readers to ignore the operations
c603 and s606 for the time being; these will be discussed in Section 5.2.3. The proxy now obtains
γ in c602, which is equal to q + r, where q is the current DFA state and r was chosen by the server
in s603. It now uses γ as input (as opposed to r in Π4(E)) into the Shift procedure first described in











As a consequence of this “shift”, the plaintexts of the coefficients 〈aˆ′σi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[n] define a new
polynomial f ′σ(x) such that f
′
σ(x) = fσ(x +R (q +R r)). The proxy then sends 〈aˆ′σi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[n] to
the server in m604. The server, knowing r, blindly “evaluates” the polynomial f ′σ(x) on value
(−
R
r) for each σ ∈ Σ, in lines s607–s609. Specifically, it computes a ciphertext of f ′σ(−Rr) =




aˆ′σi ·pk (−Rr)i (5.5)
A naive way to compute Eqn. 5.5 requires O(n2) exponentiations, but by leveraging Horner’s rule it
can be reduced toO(n) exponentiations. Once the server obtains {ωσ}σ∈Σ, it calculates a ciphertext
α of the correct next DFA state in line s610, i.e., by homomorphically summing ωσ ⊙pk ckσ over
all σ ∈ Σ. (Recall from Section 5.2.1 that, for fixed k, exactly one of 〈ckσ〉σ∈Σ is a ciphertext of 1
and the rest are ciphertexts of 0.) The key point to notice here is that, by rearranging the protocol
messages and letting the proxy send over the shifted coefficients, the number of pairing operations
are chopped down to only m from nm, a major improvement.
We have already alluded the potential benefit of pairing preprocessing to reduce the online cost
of pairing operations. The only question left is how to adapt the protocol so that it is amenable to
using this technique. Fortunately, the changes we have just made to the protocol also makes pairing
preprocessing possible. The pairing operation that the server needs to perform in s610 is e(ωσ, ckσ),
for σ ∈ Σ and k ∈ [ℓ]. The ciphertext ckσ is fixed and known even before the protocol starts. This
allows the server to perform pairing preprocessing using these ciphertexts offline and store them to
stable storage for future use. During the protocol run, the preprocessing information can be retrieved
and used to greatly reduce the online costs of the pairing operations.
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5.2.3 Shifting
After the above optimizations, a remaining computation in the protocol that is especially ex-
pensive is the Shift procedure, i.e., Eqn. 5.4, which is performed as part of c604 (and c608). Com-
puting each aˆ′σi requires O(n) exponentiations with exponents being powers of γ. Since γ is κ
′
bits, this exponentiation is increasingly expensive as κ′ grows, and is one of the performance bot-
tlenecks of our implementation for the κ′ values we employ. (As discussed in Section 5.1.2, we
take κ′ ≈ log2 n+15 in our present implementation, though this setting is an artifact of using BGN
encryption and could be larger with another encryption scheme.) Our next target is thus to find ways
to optimize this operation.
One possibility is to use a smaller κ′ to speed up the exponentiations. However, κ′ cannot be
arbitrarily reduced without compromising the security of the protocol. Instead, here we propose









·pk (γ mod n)i′ (5.6)
in Shift, instead. (See c603 and c607.) By reducing γ, the exponents that used to be O(nκ′) bits
long are now reduced to O(n log n) bits, after taking into account the exponentiations on γ itself.
However, this change does have implications for the correctness of the computation. Referring to the
derivation in Eqn. 5.5, now that the proxy shifted the polynomial by γ mod n , the server needs to
adapt to this change accordingly. Intuitively, it should evaluate the new polynomial on (−r mod n)
as opposed to on −
R
r in Eqn. 5.5, in which case it computes a ciphertext ωσ of




fσ(q) if n | r or q + (r mod n) ≥ n
fσ(q + n) otherwise
assuming that κ′ + 1 < κ. (See lines s606 and s615.) However, as indicated, there are two possible
outcomes from this calculation. One is exactly what we want, i.e., a ciphertext of fσ(q). The other
possibility is a ciphertext of fσ(q + n), which is problematic because fσ(q + n) is arbitrary. The
server unfortunately cannot tell which case happened because everything it operates on is encrypted.
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Our solution to this problem is to add constraints when constructing fσ(x) so that fσ(q + n) =
fσ(q) for all q ∈ Q and σ ∈ Σ. These additional constraints guarantee the correct state transition
regardless of which case happens. However, the price we pay is that the degree of fσ(x) increases to
2n−1 since additional n constraints need to be added to define the polynomial. But the performance
gains we achieve outweigh this loss.
Another key insight to draw from this technique is the fact that γ mod n can only take on n
different values and so there can be at most n different sets of coefficients 〈aˆ′σi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n] from the
calculation of the Shift procedure in Eqn. 5.6. This allows the proxy to precompute all possible sets
of 〈aˆ′σi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n] for each γ mod n ∈ [n] and store them in a table before the start of the protocol.
It can then simply perform table lookups depending on which value of γ mod n it obtains in c603
(or c607). This way, the proxy does not need to perform the computations in Eqn. 5.6 during the
protocol except for randomizing the ciphertexts before sending them back to the server. This offers
tremendous performance gains for the protocol: Without applying this optimization, the cost for the
proxy to calculate Eqn. 5.6 for all 〈aˆ′σi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n] involves O(mn2) exponentiations in each round.
After applying this optimization, it is reduced to only O(mn) exponentiations, due to the need for
ciphertext randomizations.
5.2.4 Packing the Result Ciphertexts
When using Π5(E) to evaluate a DFA on k files, k encrypted evaluation results Θ0, . . . ,Θk−1
— each the ciphertext of a 0 or 1 — need to be communicated back to the user. Sending these k
ciphertexts individually to the user introduces an undesirably high communication cost between the
proxy and the user. A better approach is for the proxy to aggregate multiple such results into a single
ciphertext before sending these results back to the user. Specifically, the proxy can aggregate these





for each i ∈ [⌈k/z⌉]. This aggregation is omitted from Fig. 5.3. The user can then decrypt each
~Θi to recover all the evaluation results. The value of z is upper bounded by the bit length of the
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c601. for k ← 0 . . . ℓ− 1 s602. for k ← 0 . . . ℓ− 1
s603. r
$← {0, 1}κ′
s604. α← α+pk Encpk (r)




c602. γ ← Dec2sk1(α, β)






s607. for σ ∈ Σ









c605. endfor s611. endfor
s612. r
$← {0, 1}κ′
s613. α← α+pk Encpk (r)




c606. γ ← Dec2sk1(α, β)
















Figure 5.3: Optimized protocol Π5(E), described in Section 5.2
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plaintext space of the cryptosystem E in general, and in the case of BGN, z must be restricted to a
small value such as κ′ to enable efficient decryption by the user.
This packing technique generalizes nicely to support evaluating conjunctions or disjunctions of
d DFAs on k files. That is, after the proxy interacts with the server to evaluate DFAs M0, . . ., Md
on each of k files, yielding encrypted results Θ0,0, . . ., Θk−1,d−1, the proxy can aggregate these kd
ciphertexts into ciphertexts ~Θ0, . . . , ~Θ⌈k/z′⌉−1 where z










for each i ∈ [⌈k/z′⌉]. Upon decrypting each such aggregate ciphertext, each ⌈log2(d + 1)⌉-length
sequence of bits represents the number of DFAsM0, . . . Md−1 that the corresponding file matched.
That is, the file satisfies the disjunction of these DFAs if that count is nonzero, and it satisfies the
conjunction of these DFAs if that count is d.
To evaluate other Boolean combinations of d DFAs on files, it suffices for the proxy and server
to evaluate each DFA individually on each file and communicate the results per DFA to the user,
and the user can herself determine which files match the Boolean combination she is interested in.
While less communication-efficient than the above approach for conjunctions and disjunctions, this
approach is more computationally efficient for the proxy and server than combining all d DFAs into
a single large DFA that represents the Boolean combination of interest.
5.3 Protocol Security
In this section, we prove the security of Π5(E). We show that the protocol provably protects
the privacy of both the DFA and file contents from either arbitrarily malicious proxy or arbitrarily
malicious server adversaries.
5.3.1 Security Against Server Adversaries
In this section we bound the advantage that an arbitrarily malicious server gains by executing
this protocol, in terms of its ability to determine either the DFA that the proxy is evaluating or the
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Experiment Expts-dfaΠ5(E)(S1, S2)
(pk , sk )← Gen(1κ)
(sk1, sk2) ← Share(sk)
(ℓ, 〈σk〉k∈[ℓ],M0,M1, φ) ← S1(pk , sk2)
if |M0.Q| 6= |M1.Q| orM0.Σ 6= M1.Σ then return 0
b
$← {0, 1}
〈Q,Σ, δ, qinit,∆〉 ←Mb
n← |Q|,m← |Σ|
for k ∈ [ℓ], σ ∈ Σ
if σ = σk then ckσ ← Encpk (1)
else ckσ ← Encpk (0)
〈aσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n] ← ToPoly(Q,Σ, δ)
〈zi〉i∈[2n] ← ToPoly(Q,Σ,∆)
for σ ∈ Σ, i ∈ [2n]
aˆσi ← Encpk (aσi)
for i ∈ [2n]
zˆi ← Encpk (zi)








if b′ = b then return 1
else return 0
Figure 5.4: Experiments for proving DFA privacy of Π5(E) against server adversaries
plaintext of the file in its possession. That is, we prove the privacy of the file and DFA inputs against
server adversaries.
Following the security definitions in Chapter 3, we formalize our security claims against server
compromise by defining two separate server adversaries. The first server adversary S = (S1, S2)
attacks the encrypted DFA M = 〈Q, Σ, δ, qinit, ∆〉, i.e., 〈aˆσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[n] held by the proxy, as
described in experiment Expts-dfaΠ5(E) in Fig. 5.4. S1 first generates a file 〈σk〉k∈[ℓ] and two DFAs
M0,M1. (Note that we use, e.g., “M0.Q” and “M1.Q” to disambiguate their state sets.) S2 is then
invoked with the ciphertexts 〈ckσ〉k∈[ℓ],σ∈Σ of its file and information φ created for it by S1, and is
given oracle access to proxyOr. proxyOr is given input arguments pertaining to one of the two DFAs
output by S1, selected at random (as indicated by b).
proxyOr responds to queries from S2 as follows, ignoring malformed queries. The first query
(say, consisting of simply “start”) causes proxyOr to begin the protocol; proxyOr responds with a
message of the form n, αinit (i.e., of the form of message m601). The second invocation by S2 must
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include a single integer ℓ (i.e., of the form of message m602). The next ℓ queries by S2 must be
the form α and β, i.e., two values as in message m603, to which proxyOr responds by sending 2nm
elements of Cpk , i.e., 〈aˆ′σi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n] as inm604. S2’s next query to proxyOr again must contain two
values of the form α and β (as in m605), to which proxyOr responds with 2n ciphertexts 〈zˆi′〉i∈[2n]
as in m606. The next (and last) query by S2 can consist one element of Cpk as in m607.
Eventually S2 outputs a bit b
′, and Expts-dfaΠ5(E)(S) = 1 only if b
′ = b. We say the advantage of
an arbitrarily malicious S is





and define Advs-dfaΠ5(E)(t, ℓ, n,m) = maxS Adv
s-dfa
Π5(E)
(S) where the maximum is taken over all ad-
versaries S taking time t and selecting a file of length ℓ and DFAs containing n states and an alphabet
ofm symbols.
We reduce DFA privacy against server attacks to the IND-CPA [10] security of the encryption
scheme, which was defined in the experiment in Fig. 3.3 in Chapter 3, in which an adversary U is
provided a public key pˆk and access to an oracle Encbˆ
pˆk
(·, ·) that consistently encrypts either the first
of its two inputs (if bˆ = 0) or the second of those inputs (if bˆ = 1). Eventually U outputs a guess bˆ′
at bˆ, and Expt
ind-cpa
E (U) = 1 only if bˆ
′ = bˆ. The IND-CPA advantage of U is defined as
Adv
ind-cpa









E (t, w) = maxU Adv
ind-cpa
E (U) where the maximum is taken over all adver-
saries U executing in time t and making w queries to Encbˆ
pˆk
(·, ·).
In our theorem statements, we omit terms that are negligible as a function of the security pa-
rameters κ and κ′. For any E operation op, we use top to denote the time required to perform op;
e.g., tDec is the time to perform a Dec operation.
Theorem 8. For t′ = t + tShare + (ℓm+ 2nm+ 2n + 1) · tEnc ,
Advs-dfaΠ5(BGN)(t, ℓ, n,m) ≤ nℓ+1Adv
ind-cpa
BGN (t
′, 2nm+ 2n+ 1)
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Proof. Given an adversary S = (S1, S2) forΠ5(BGN) that runs in time t, produces a file of length ℓ,
and produces DFAs of n states over an alphabet ofm symbols, we construct an IND-CPA attacker U
for BGN to demonstrate the theorem as follows. On input a BGN public key pˆk = 〈N ,G,G′, e, g, h,
gˆ〉, U sets d2 $← ZN , and invokes S1(pˆk , sk2) where sk2 = 〈G,G′, d2〉 to obtain (ℓ, 〈σk〉k∈[ℓ],M0,
M1, φ). Note that d2 is chosen from a distribution that is perfectly indistinguishable from that from
which d2 is chosen in the real system. If |M0.Q| 6= |M1.Q| or M0.Σ 6= M1.Σ, then U aborts the
simulation. Otherwise, letting Σ = M0.Σ,m = |Σ| and n = |M0.Q|, U computes 〈a0σi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n]
← ToPoly(M0.Q, Σ, M0.δ) and 〈a1σi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n] ← ToPoly(M1.Q,Σ,M1.δ), and it sets aˆσi ←
Encbˆ
pˆk
(a0σi, a1σi) for σ ∈ Σ and i ∈ [n]. It then computes 〈z0i〉i∈[2n] ← ToPoly(M0.Q,Σ,M0.∆)
and 〈z1i〉i∈[2n] ← ToPoly(M1.Q,Σ,M1.∆), and it sets zˆi ← Encbˆpˆk (z0i, z1i) for i ∈ [n]. U finally
sets αinit ← Encbˆpˆk (M0.qinit,M1.qinit), and then for all k ∈ [ℓ], σ ∈ Σ, it sets ckσ ← Encpk (1) if
σ = σk and ckσ ← Encpk (0) otherwise.
U then invokes S2(φ, 〈ckσ〉k∈[ℓ],σ∈Σ) and simulates responses to S2’s queries to proxyOr as fol-
lows (ignoring malformed invocations). Upon initializing S2, U sends n, αinit to S2 and gets ℓ in re-
turn. For the k-th query of the form α, β (0 ≤ k < ℓ), U selects γ $← [n], as opposed to decrypting
it as in a real execution (see c602 and c603). It computes 〈aˆ′σi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n] ← Shift(γ, 〈aˆσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n])
as in c604 and returns 〈aˆ′σi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n] to S2. For the (ℓ+ 1)-th query of the form α, β, U again ran-
domly sets γ
$← [n] and 〈zˆi′〉i∈[2n] ← Shift(γ, 〈zˆi〉i∈[2n]) and then sends 〈zˆi′〉i∈[2n] to S2. Finally,
when S2 outputs b
′, U outputs b′, as well.
U’s simulation is perfectly indistinguishable from the real system to an arbitrarily malicious
server adversary S if and only if U made the correct guesses on γ in each round. When that hap-




ℓ+1Advs-dfaΠ5(BGN)(S). Note that U runs in time t
′ = t+tShare+ℓm·tEnc+(2nm+2n+1)·tEnc due
to the need to generate a secret key share for S, to generate 〈ckj〉k∈[ℓ],j∈[m], and to make 2nm+2n+1
encryption oracle queries to create 〈aˆσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n], 〈zˆi〉i∈[2n] and αinit.
The second server adversary S = (S1, S2) attacks the file for which it holds the per-symbol
ciphertexts 〈ckσ〉k∈[ℓ],σ∈Σ as in experiment Expts-fileΠ5(E) shown in Fig. 5.5. Here, S1 produces two
separate, equal-length plaintext files 〈σ0k〉k∈[ℓ], 〈σ1k〉k∈[ℓ] and a DFA M. S2 then receives the
ciphertexts 〈ckσ〉k∈[ℓ],σ∈Σ for file 〈σbk〉k∈[ℓ] where b is chosen randomly. S2 is also given oracle
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Experiment Expts-fileΠ5(E) (S1, S2)
(pk , sk) ← Gen(1κ)
(sk1, sk 2) ← Share(sk)
(ℓ, 〈σ0k〉k∈[ℓ], 〈σ1k〉k∈[ℓ],M, φ) ← S1(pk , sk2)
b
$← {0, 1}
〈Q,Σ, δ, qinit,∆〉 ←M
n← |Q|,m← |Σ|
for k ∈ [ℓ], σ ∈ Σ
if σ = σbk then ckσ ← Encpk (1)
else ckσ ← Encpk (0)
〈aσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n] ← ToPoly(Q,Σ, δ)
〈zi〉i∈[2n] ← ToPoly(Q,Σ,∆)
for σ ∈ Σ, i ∈ [2n]
aˆσi ← Encpk (aσi)
for i ∈ [2n]
zˆi ← Encpk (zi)








if b′ = b then return 1
else return 0
Figure 5.5: Experiments for proving file privacy of Π5(E) against server adversaries
access to proxyOr(pk , sk 1,Σ, n, αinit, 〈aˆσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n], 〈zˆi′〉i∈[2n]). The interaction between S2 and
proxyOr is similar to what was described for the server DFA adversary. Eventually S2 outputs a bit
b′, and Expts-fileΠ5(E) (S) = 1 iff b
′ = b. The advantage of S is
Advs-fileΠ5(E) (S) = 2 · P
(
Expts-fileΠ5(E) (S) = 1
)
− 1
and then Advs-fileΠ5(E) (t, ℓ, n,m) = maxS Adv
s-file
Π5(E)
(S) where the maximum is taken over all ad-
versaries S = (S1, S2) taking time t and producing (from S1) files of ℓ symbols and a DFA of n
states and alphabet of sizem.
Theorem 9. For t′ = t + tShare + (ℓm+ 2nm+ 2n + 1) · tEnc ,





Proof. Given an adversary S = (S1, S2) running in time t and selecting files of length ℓ symbols
and a DFA of n states over an alphabet of m symbols, we construct an IND-CPA adversary U. On
input a BGN public key pˆk = 〈N , G, G′, e, g, h, gˆ〉, U sets d2 $← ZN , and invokes S1(pˆk , sk2)
where sk2 = 〈G,G′, d2〉 to obtain (ℓ, 〈σ0k〉k∈[ℓ], 〈σ1k〉k∈[ℓ], M, φ), where M = 〈Q, Σ, qinit, δ,
∆〉 is a DFA. Note that d2 is chosen from a distribution that is perfectly indistinguishable from that










1 if σ = σ1k
0 otherwise
U also sets αinit ← Encpˆk (qinit), 〈aσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n] ← ToPoly(Q,Σ, δ), and 〈zi〉i∈[2n] ← ToPoly(Q,
Σ,∆). U then computes aˆσi ← Encpˆk (aσi) and zˆi ← Encpˆk (zi) for all σ ∈ Σ and i ∈ [2n].
U then invokes S2(φ, 〈ckσ〉k∈[ℓ],σ∈Σ) and simulates responses to S2’s queries to proxyOr as fol-
lows (ignoring malformed invocations). Upon initializing S2, U sends n, αinit to S2 and gets ℓ in
return. For the k-th query of the form α, β (0 ≤ k < ℓ), U selects γ $← [n], as opposed to decrypt-
ing it as in a real execution c602 and c603. U then sets 〈aˆ′σi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n] ← Shift(γ, 〈aˆσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n])
as done in c604 and returns 〈aˆ′σi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n] to S2. For the (ℓ+1)-th query of the form α, β, U again
randomly sets γ
$← [n] and then computes 〈zˆi′〉i∈[2n] ← Shift(γ, 〈zˆi〉i∈[2n]) and sends 〈zˆi′〉i∈[2n]
to S2. Finally when S2 outputs b
′, U outputs b′, as well.
This simulation is perfectly indistinguishable from the real system provided that U made correct
guesses for γ on each round of the simulation. When that happens, U wins his game if and only
if S wins his. So we have Adv
ind-cpa
BGN (U) ≥ ( 1n)ℓ+1Advs-fileΠ5(BGN)(S). U runs in time t′ = t +
tShare + (2nm + 2n + 1) · tEnc + ℓm · tEnc due to the need to generate a secret key share for S,
to generate αinit, 〈aˆσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n] and 〈zˆi〉i∈[2n], and to make ℓm queries to its encryption oracle to
create 〈ckσ〉k∈[ℓ],σ∈Σ.
The multiplicative factor of nℓ+1 that appears in Thm. 8 and Thm. 9, while independent of the
security parameters κ and κ′, nevertheless renders these theorems of limited practical use. That said,
we have no reason to believe that the actual security of Π5(BGN) against server adversaries decays
so dramatically as a function of ℓ. Rather, this factor is simply an artifact of our proof method,






(pk , sk)← Gen(1κ)
(sk1, sk2) ← Share(sk)
(ℓ, 〈σk〉k∈[ℓ],M0,M1, φ) ← P1(pk , sk 1)
if |M0.Q| 6= |M1.Q| orM0.Σ 6= M1.Σ, then return 0
b
$← {0, 1}
〈Q,Σ, δ, qinit,∆〉 ←Mb
n← |Q|,m← |Σ|
for k ∈ [ℓ], σ ∈ Σ
if σ = σk then ckσ ← Encpk (1)
else ckσ ← Encpk (0)
〈aσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n] ← ToPoly(Q,Σ, δ)
〈zi〉i∈[2n] ← ToPoly(Q,Σ,∆)
for σ ∈ Σ, i ∈ [2n]
aˆσi ← Encpk (aσi)
for i ∈ [2n]
zˆi ← Encpk (zi)







2 (φ, αinit, 〈aˆσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n], 〈zˆi〉i∈[2n])
if b′ = b then return 1
else return 0
Figure 5.6: Experiments for proving DFA privacy of Π5(E) against proxy adversaries
created using a public key for which it does not hold the private key, we believe these theorems to
be overwhelmingly conservative.
5.3.2 Security Against Proxy Adversaries
In this section we analyze the privacy of the DFA and file from proxy adversaries, specifically
honest-but-curious ones. Our protocol’s security is limited to honest-but-curious proxies as an ar-
tifact of using BGN encryption, specifically because this forces us to employ κ′ ≪ κ. Advances
in additively homomorphic encryption that also supports “one-time” homomorphic multiplication,
and that also permits us to employ κ′ ≈ κ, would permit us to prove security against malicious
proxy adversaries, as well.
The case of proxy adversaries in Π5(E) differs more substantially from that in Chapter 3. For
one, we need to formalize and prove a result about the degree to which the DFA is protected from the
proxy. Such an experiment for defining this type of security is shown in Fig. 5.6. In this experiment,
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P2 is invoked with encrypted coefficients 〈aˆσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n], 〈zˆi〉i∈[2n] and the encrypted initial state
αinit for one of two DFAs output by P1 (determined by random selection of b). P2 can invoke
serverOr first with an integer n and a ciphertext (as inm601), in response to which serverOr returns
ℓ (as in m602). In the next ℓ rounds, each time serverOr sends ciphertexts α and β (as in m603),
to P2. P2 then responds with ciphertexts 〈aˆ′σi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n] in response (as in m604). The next round,
serverOr again sends α and β (as in m605) to S2, who responds with ciphertexts 〈zˆi′〉i∈[2n] as in
m606. serverOr sends one last message consisting one element in Cpk to S2 as in m607. Finally,




(P) = 1 only if b′ = b.
We prove DFA privacy against honest-but-curious proxy adversaries. A proxy adversary (P1, P2)



















(t, ℓ, n,m) = maxP Adv
p-dfa
Π5(E)
(P) where the maximum is taken over all honest-
but-curious client adversaries P running in total time t and producing files of length ℓ and a DFA of
n over an alphabet ofm symbols.
We now prove the DFA privacy against an honest-but-curious proxy adversary.




(t, ℓ, n,m) ≤ Advind-cpaBGN (t′, 2(nm+ n+ 1))
Proof. Given an adversary P = (P1, P2) running in time t and selecting files of length ℓ and a
DFA of n states over an alphabet of m symbols, we construct an IND-CPA adversary U. On input
a BGN public key pˆk = 〈N , G, G′, e, g, h, gˆ〉, U sets d1 $← ZN , and invokes P1(pˆk , sk1) where
sk1 = 〈G,G′, d1〉 to obtain (ℓ, 〈σk〉k∈[ℓ],M0,M1, φ). Note that d1 is chosen from a distribution that
is perfectly indistinguishable from that from which d1 is chosen in the real system. If |M0.Q| 6=
|M1.Q| or M0.Σ 6= M1.Σ, then U aborts the simulation. Letting Σ = M0.Σ, m = |Σ| and
n = |M0.Q|, U computes 〈a0σi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n] ← ToPoly(M0.Q, Σ, M0.δ) and 〈a1σi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n] ←
ToPoly(M1.Q,Σ,M1.δ), and then sets aˆσi ← Encbˆpˆk (a0σi, a1σi) for σ ∈ Σ and i ∈ [2n]. It also
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computes 〈z0i〉i∈[2n] ← ToPoly(M0.Q,Σ,M0.∆) and 〈z1i〉i∈[2n] ← ToPoly(M1.Q,Σ,M1.∆), and
then sets zˆi ← Encbˆpˆk (z0i, z1i) for i ∈ [2n]. U then sets αinit ← Encbˆpˆk (M0.qinit,M1.qinit). For all
k ∈ [ℓ], σ ∈ Σ, U also sets ckσ ← Encpk (1) if σ = σk and ckσ ← Encpk (0) otherwise.
U invokes P2(φ, αinit, 〈aˆσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n], 〈zˆi〉i∈[2n]) and simulates responses to P2’s queries to
serverOr as follows. Upon receiving the first message from P2, U sends back ℓ. In each round,
U sets r
$← {0, 1}κ′ , α ← Enc
pˆk
(r) and β ← grα−d1 so that αd1β = gr . It then sends α and
β to P2. In the last round, upon receiving 〈zˆi〉i∈[n] as in m606, U sets Θ ← Encbˆpˆk (M0(〈σk〉k∈[ℓ]),
M1(〈σk〉k∈[ℓ])) where M0(〈σk〉k∈[ℓ]) denotes the evaluation result of M0 on the file and similarly
forM1(〈σk〉k∈[ℓ]). U then sends Θ to P2. Finally, when P2 outputs b′, U outputs b′ as well.
U’s simulation is statistically indistinguishable (as a function of κ′) from a real protocol exe-
cution as long as P2 is honest-but-curious. So Adv
ind-cpa
BGN (U) ≥ hbcAdvp-dfaΠ5(BGN)(P). U runs in
time t′ = t + tShare + ℓm · tEnc + (2nm + 2n + 2) · tEnc due to the need to generate a secret key
share for P, to create 〈ckσ〉k∈[ℓ],σ∈Σ, and to make 2nm+ 2n+ 2 queries to its encryption oracle in
order to generate 〈aˆσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n], 〈zˆi〉i∈[2n], αinit and Θ in the final round.
Next, we consider security against attacks on the encrypted files from a proxy adversary. Since
the proxy no longer learns the final state of the DFA evaluation, we do not require the proxy ad-
versary to choose two files that produce the same final result for the user’s DFA, compared to the




is shown in Fig. 5.7. There, P1 produces two separate, equal-length
plaintext files 〈σ0k〉k∈[ℓ], 〈σ1k〉k∈[ℓ] and a DFA M. P2 then receives the ciphertexts 〈ckσ〉k∈[ℓ],σ∈Σ
for file 〈σbk〉k∈[ℓ] where b is chosen randomly. P2 is also given oracle access to serverOr and finally




(P) = 1 iff b′ = b. The advantage of an honest-but-curious















(t, ℓ, n,m) = maxP hbcAdv
p-file
Π5(E)
(P) where the maximum is taken over all
honest-but-curious proxy adversaries P running in total time t and producing files of length ℓ and a






(pk , sk)← Gen(1κ)
(sk1, sk2) ← Share(sk)
(ℓ, 〈σ0k〉k∈[ℓ], 〈σ1k〉k∈[ℓ],M, φ) ← P1(pk , sk1)
b
$← {0, 1}
〈Q,Σ, δ, qinit,∆〉 ←M
n← |Q|,m← |Σ|
for k ∈ [ℓ], σ ∈ Σ
if σ = σbk then ckσ ← Encpk (1)
else ckσ ← Encpk (0)
〈aσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n] ← ToPoly(Q,Σ, δ)
〈zi〉i∈[2n] ← ToPoly(Q,Σ, δ)
for σ ∈ Σ, i ∈ [2n]
aˆσi ← Encpk (aσi)
for i ∈ [2n]
zˆi ← Encpk (zi)







2 (φ, αinit, 〈aˆσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n], 〈zˆi〉i∈[2n])
if b′ = b then return 1
else return 0
Figure 5.7: Experiments for proving file privacy of Π5(E) against proxy adversaries




(t, ℓ, n,m) ≤ Advind-cpaBGN (t′, ℓm+ 1)
Proof. Given an adversary P = (P1, P2) running in time t and selecting files of length ℓ and a
DFA of n states over an alphabet of m symbols, we construct an IND-CPA adversary U. On input
a BGN public key pˆk = 〈N , G, G′, e, g, h, gˆ〉, U sets d1 $← ZN , and invokes P1(pˆk , sk1)
where sk1 = 〈G,G′, d1〉 to obtain (ℓ, 〈σ0k〉k∈[ℓ], 〈σ1k〉k∈[ℓ],M, φ). Note that d1 is chosen from a
distribution that is perfectly indistinguishable from that from which d1 is chosen in the real system.
Let Σ = M.Σ, Q = M.Q, ∆ = M.∆, m = |Σ| and n = |Q|. For k ∈ [ℓ] and σ ∈ Σ, U sets









1 if σ = σ1k
0 otherwise
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U also sets αinit ← Encpˆk (qinit), 〈aσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n] ← ToPoly(Q,Σ, δ), and 〈zi〉i∈[2n] ← ToPoly(Q,
Σ,∆). U then computes aˆσi ← Encpˆk (aσi) and zˆi ← Encpˆk (zi) for all σ ∈ Σ and i ∈ [2n].
U invokes P2(φ, αinit, 〈aˆσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n], 〈zˆi〉i∈[2n]) and simulates responses to P2’s queries to
serverOr as follows. Upon receiving the first message from P2, U sends back ℓ. In each round,
U sets r
$← {0, 1}κ′ , α ← Enc
pˆk
(r) and β ← grα−d1 so that αd1β = gr . It then sends α and
β to P2. In the last round, upon receiving 〈zˆi〉i∈[n] as in m606, U sets Θ ← Encbˆpˆk (M(〈σ0k〉k∈[ℓ]),
M(〈σ1k〉k∈[ℓ])). U then sends Θ to P2. Finally, when P2 outputs b′, U outputs b′ as well.
U’s simulation is statistically indistinguishable (as a function of κ′) from a real protocol exe-
cution as long as P2 is honest-but-curious. So Adv
ind-cpa
BGN (U) ≥ hbcAdvp-fileΠ5(BGN)(P). U runs in
time t′ = t + tShare + (2nm+ 2n+ 1) · tEnc + (ℓm+ 1) · tEnc due to the need to generate a secret
key share for P, to generate 〈aˆσi〉σ∈Σ,i∈[2n] , 〈zˆi〉i∈[2n] and αinit, and to make ℓm+ 1 queries to its
encryption oracle in order to create 〈ckσ〉k∈[ℓ],σ∈Σ and Θ in the last round.
5.4 Performance Evaluation
5.4.1 Implementation
We implemented our optimized protocol Π5(E) in Java using an open source Java pairing based
cryptography library jPBC [21], which is built on the original C pairing library PBC [53]. Our
regular-expression-to-DFA conversion engine is built around the Java dk.brics.automaton library
[57]. The complete implementation contains about 5000 physical source lines of code.
For the evaluation we report here, we chose a BGN public key of size κ = 1024 and a secondary
security parameter of κ′ = 22. To further improve performance, we utilized a fixed-base window-
ing exponentiation technique [56] to accelerate exponentiation operations on the proxy side. We
also take advantage of pairing preprocessing at the server (see Section 5.2.2) and compare the per-
formance with and without this optimization. In particular, pairing preprocessing produces approxi-
mately 600KB of information per BGN ciphertext and so increases the required storage dramatically.
As such, it may not be appropriate for use in some environments.
To exploit parallelisms available in the protocol computation and the physical hardware, we
implemented two levels of parallelization for the server and proxy programs. The first level is a
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thread pool of workers each running a single server or proxy instance. Each server worker grabs
an encrypted email from a shared queue of all the encrypted emails being searched and runs a
protocol instance with its paired proxy worker independently. Each server or proxy worker can
further spawn up to m threads to assist in its computation. This level of parallelization is designed
to take advantage of the computational independence found in many calculations in the protocol.
For example, for server workers, the calculation in line s608 can be split among up to m threads
before combining the results to obtain α. Similarly for client workers, the Shift procedure in line
c604 can also be dispatched to up tom threads.
5.4.2 Microbenchmarks
We first report microbenchmarks for our implementation. The experiments reported below were
conducted using two machines, each equipped with 2 quad-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) 2.67GHz CPUs
with simultaneous multithreading enabled. All proxy workers ran on one of these machines, and all
server workers ran on the other.
To understand the performance cost of the protocol and the impact of its two parameters, i.e.,
the number of DFA states n and the alphabet size m, we conducted experiments measuring the
average time spent by the server and proxy for processing one character (or one round of protocol
execution) for various combinations of n and m. For this purpose, we generated encrypted files
each consisting of 20 characters form = 1 tom = 50. We then created random DFAs with number
of states n ranging from 1 to 50 and ran them against the files. We computed the average time
spent per character by dividing the total time spent processing a file by 20. The results, with pairing
preprocessing disabled, are presented in contour graphs in Fig. 5.8 where the times are binned into
ranges, each shown as a band representing the range indicated in the sidebar legend.
To demonstrate that the computation of the protocol is highly parallelizable, in this experiment
we launched a single worker on both server and proxy machines and tested its performance when
1, 4 and 16 threads are spawned by each worker to assist in their computations, shown in Fig. 5.8a,
Fig. 5.8b, and Fig. 5.8c, respectively. It is clear from all three graphs that the protocol performance
scales much better with the increase of n than withm. This phenomenon is due to the fact that the
number of expensive pairing operations performed by the server in each round is equal to m, and
the cost resulted from the increase of m significantly outweighs that resulting from the increase of
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n. These results also show that the protocol is highly amenable to parallelization, with dramatically























































(c) 16 threads per worker
























































(c) 16 threads per worker
Figure 5.9: Time spent per file character in milliseconds, with pairing preprocessing enabled
Since Fig. 5.8 clearly shows the impact of the pairing operations on the overall performance of
the protocol, we went on to evaluate how much improvement pairing preprocessing can provide. In
these experiments, we applied pairing processing on the file ciphertexts before conducting the same
experiments as described above. The results are shown in Fig. 5.9. As expected, the overall protocol
performance improves significantly in each of the multi-threading cases, with darker bands reduced
dramatically in size. More importantly, the protocol performance now scales much better with the
increase ofm because of the significantly reduced cost of pairing operations on the server side.
In order to better understand the relative computational burden imposed on the server and proxy
by the protocol, we also conducted experiments measuring the average CPU time spent processing
one character for the server and proxy processes for each combination of n and m. To perform
these tests, we instantiated one server worker and one proxy worker, each with a single thread. The











































































(d) Network bandwidth per file character
Figure 5.10: CPU time and network bandwidth measurements
for the server and proxy are plotted in Fig. 5.10a and Fig. 5.10c respectively. For the server side, it
generally takes below or around 100ms for one round of computation when m is less than 10. The
proxy side enjoys a slightly lighter computational cost and spends around or below 100ms even for
m as high as 50 with n less than 15. The results reveal that the server side takes more hit when
m increases due to the need to perform the pairing operations, while the proxy achieves a more
balanced degradation with the increasing of n orm.
We also conducted the same experiments when pairing preprocessing is used on the file cipher-
texts in advance. Since it does not affect the proxy side processing time, we only show the server
side CPU time in Fig. 5.10b. Compared with Fig. 5.10a, the CPU time spent is reduced significantly
and the performance scales better asm increases.
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Since the protocol is interactive, we also measured the aggregate network bandwidth consump-
tion between the server and proxy in one round of protocol execution. As shown in Fig. 5.10d, the
bandwidth usage ranges from about 15KB per round (i.e., per file character) for moderate n and m
to as much as 640KB per round when n andm are 50.
5.4.3 Case Study: Regular Expression Search on Encrypted Emails
To further provide insight into the expected performance when using our protocol in real-world
application, we conducted a case study for performing regular expression search on public-key
encrypted emails. We envision an email system in which the sender encrypts the email body using
a traditional hybrid encryption scheme, in which the email body is encrypted using a symmetric
encryption key which itself is encrypted by the receiver’s public key. To enable search operations,
however, the sender also attaches an encrypted searchable “header” to the encrypted email body that
consists of all the information from the email that allows searching. We now detail the design of
this header.
5.4.3.1 Header Information
Our current design allows searching on selected header fields of the email that are most com-
monly searched: (1) date; (2) sender email address; (3) sender name; and (4) subject line. The
character-by-character encryption of the four headers are attached to the encrypted email body to
enable searches. Since characters in each header are usually drawn from different distributions, we
define the dictionary of a header as the set containing all possible characters and field-specific words
that can be used in that header. Each header-field text is encoded using the dictionary before encryp-
tion, including sanitizing any characters not present in the dictionary (e.g., converting uppercase
letters to lowercase, if only lowercase are included in the dictionary). We stress that this sanitization
is only applied to the encrypted header that facilitates the search operations. The original field value
in the email body is left intact.
The benefit of defining different dictionaries for different header fields is that adding field-
specific words provides an opportunity for compressing the header fields, which is reminiscent of
dictionary-based compression schemes. In addition, we envision dictionaries to be receiver-specific,
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e.g., distributed within the public-key certificate for the receiver. Below we describe how each
dictionary is defined for each header in our evaluation.
Date: Date is converted into YYMMDD, where year, month and day each consists of two digits
of numerical values. For years, we expect to store emails dated from 1990 to 2050. So we included
“90” to “50”, as words, in the dictionary to encode the year. Similarly for months and days, we also
added “01” to “31” into the dictionary. So the dictionary is defined as {00, 01, 02, . . ., 49, 50 } ∪
{90, 91, . . ., 99 }.
Sender address: The sender email address is represented in the usual format, e.g., “alice@abc.com”,
where the dictionary consists of “a” through “z”, “0” through “9”, “.”, “@”, “ ” and “−”. We also
added into the dictionary several common email service names like “gmail”, domain names like
“com”, and “enron” because the email dataset used in our evaluation (see Section 5.4.3.3) was from
Enron. (Again, dictionaries can be receiver-specific). In total, the dictionary for this field is {a, . . .,
z } ∪ {0, . . ., 9 } ∪ {@, ., , − } ∪ {gmail, yahoo, aol, hotmail, enron, com, edu, net, org }.
Sender name: The sender name field represents the sender’s name with first name followed by
the last name, separated by a space. The name dictionary consists of “a” through “z” and the space
character.
Subject line: The subject line is allowed to include arbitrary characters that can be typed from a
keyboard. However, in practice, users rarely create search queries including special characters [40].
So in our design we restrict the dictionary to include “a” through “z”, “0” through “9”, and selected
special characters including “@”, “!”, “%”, “.” and the space character.
5.4.3.2 Encoding
To enable DFA evaluations, we need to define the input alphabet Σ that drives the DFA state
transitions. The simplest way is to define it as the union of all the dictionaries defined for all header
fields, which would result in anm well above 50. However, the experiment results in Section 5.4.2
suggested that the protocol performance is very sensitive to a largem. So wemake the DFA alphabet
Σ and its size m a user defined parameter and designed a method to encode each word in the
dictionary into a representation using the input symbols in Σ. Since the exact representation of
the input symbols in Σ is not important, for simplicity we use numerical values to represent each
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symbol. For example, a size m alphabet will consists of Σ = {0, 1, . . . ,m − 1}. Then, each word
in a dictionary is represented using a distinct sequence of symbols from Σ. Each of the header fields
is first encoded using this method and then encrypted symbol by symbol. The regular expression
query is encoded in the same way before converting it into a DFA.
5.4.3.3 Evaluations
In order to shed light on the expected performance when using our protocol to perform search
operations in real-world email systems, we implemented a prototype search system and evaluated
its performance based on the Enron email dataset [1], which is a publicly available real-world email
corpus that contains roughly 0.6 million messages from about 150 then-employees of Enron. For
privacy reasons, the attachments on the original emails were excluded from the data set. Since our
implementation does not support searches on email bodies or attachments, this has no effect on
our evaluation except to exaggerate the average multiplicative increase in email size resulting from
the encryption needed to support our search (in comparison to email encryption using standard
tools). We randomly sampled 1000 emails from the inboxes of all the users in the dataset and
performed evaluations using selected representative search queries. In the experiments, we fixed a
DFA alphabet of sizem = 4.
Motivated by the email search features found in ThunderBird [4], we selected four different
queries to evaluate the protocol efficiency. For the date field, we selected a range query to search
for all emails with date stamps between 2001/09/10 and 2002/04/20. The corresponding regular
expression is
(0109(10|11| . . . |31)) | (01(10|11|12)(01| . . . |31)) |
(02|(01|02|03)(01| . . . |31)) | (0204(01|02| . . . |20))
which results in a DFA of 23 states using our conversion engine. For the sender address field, we
selected a query to search for emails with sender address ending with the string “enron.com”. The
resulting regular expression is ∗enron.com where ∗ denotes zero or more occurrences of dictionary
words, which converts into a DFA with 9 states. For the name field, we selected the query to search
for sender name containing the word “John”, which translates into the regular expression ∗John∗
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,with a corresponding DFA containing 17 states. Lastly for the subject line field, we chose to search
for emails with subject lines containing the word “meet” followed by “Jan” followed by a space
and two arbitrary characters. This translates into a regular expression of ∗meet Jan ??∗ where ?
denotes exactly one occurrence of a dictionary word, which results in a DFA of 36 states.
We encrypted the bodies of 1000 randomly selected emails using GnuPG [3], which results in
an average size of 1.5KB per email. We wrote our own tool to generate the encrypted searchable
headers, which take up about 185KB per email. To understand the performance impact when us-
ing the two parallelization techniques described in Section 5.4.1, we report performance numbers
for various combinations of the number of workers and the number of threads that each worker
spawns. The average time spent processing each email is shown in Table 5.1, which was calculated
by dividing the total time to finish processing all 1000 emails by 1000. In order to demonstrate
the performance improvement when pairing preprocessing is applied on email ciphertexts, we also
precomputed pairing-preprocessing information of the email ciphertexts and stored them on disk.
The numbers are shown in the same table inside braces. The performance gain is very compelling,
as it offers an approximately 30% improvement over the version without preprocessing. However,
the downside is that it needs significantly more storage space to store the pairing-preprocessing
information.











1 2 4 1 2 4
1 3.55 (2.38) 2.03 (1.39) 1.23 (0.99) 13.09 (6.95) 8.00 (4.69) 6.75 (5.26)
2 1.68 (1.17) 0.96 (0.71) 0.63 (0.50) 6.68 (3.58) 3.97 (2.72) 3.45 (2.68)
4 0.84 (0.57) 0.49 (0.36) 0.42 (0.28) 3.31 (1.81) 2.01 (1.51) 2.01 (1.44)
8 0.43 (0.30) 0.30 (0.20) 0.29 (0.19) 1.70 (0.98) 1.40 (0.93) 1.34 (0.89)
16 0.27 (0.18) 0.26 (0.18) 0.25 (0.17) 1.27 (0.94) 1.25 (0.94) 1.26 (0.95)











1 2 4 1 2 4
1 12.34 (7.93) 7.55 (4.84) 4.84 (3.50) 35.97 (27.17) 20.17 (15.02) 11.38 (9.52)
2 6.47 (3.99) 3.56 (2.40) 2.40 (1.96) 17.68 (12.85) 9.49 (7.41) 5.75 (4.80)
4 3.13 (1.98) 1.82 (1.28) 1.56 (1.16) 8.59 (6.30) 4.81 (3.71) 4.20 (2.97)
8 1.62 (1.05) 1.25 (0.80) 1.15 (0.77) 4.41 (3.21) 2.81 (2.10) 3.04 (1.91)
16 1.09 (0.79) 1.06 (0.81) 1.06 (0.81) 2.49 (1.93) 2.55 (1.75) 2.39 (1.77)
Table 5.1: Average time spent per email in seconds (numbers in braces are when pairing preprocess-
ing is applied on email ciphertexts in advance)
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The experiment results also demonstrate the benefit of concurrently processing multiple emails
by instantiating multiple workers. In most cases, doubling the number of workers results in a de-
crease of the timing results by a factor of two. Meanwhile, spawning multiple threads for each
worker has similar effect, although to a lesser extent. This can be seen by reading the entries hor-
izontally, where the timing results are typically reduced by about 40% as the number of threads
per worker doubles. The date query records the fastest time to finish, averaging only a quarter of
a second to process one email and 0.17 second when pairing preprocessing is used. This is due to
the fact that the date field is very short for all emails. The sender name query came at second with
1.06 second per email and 0.76 second with pairing preprocessing. This is followed by the sender
address query, which achieves a 1.25 second and 0.89 second respectively. The subject line query
is the slowest, mainly due to the fact that subject lines in the email corpus are usually much longer




With the growth of cloud storage due to the cost savings it offers, it is imperative that we de-
velop efficient techniques for enabling the same sorts of third-party access to cloud-resident files
that is commonplace today for privately stored files — e.g., malware scans or searches by autho-
rized partners. The fact that cloud-resident files are generally at greater risk of exposure, however,
mandates their encryption, hindering these sorts of third-party access.
In this dissertation, we have developed a family of protocols for enabling regular expression
evaluation on encrypted files by third parties authorized by the file owner. Our protocols developed
in Chapter 3 provably protect the privacy of the DFA from an arbitrarily malicious server holding the
ciphertext file, as well as the privacy of the file from the server and from an honest-but-curious client
performing the DFA evaluation. We further developed a strengthened protocol in Chapter 4 that
allows the client to detect any malicious behavior of the server. In addition, the client is also able to
tell if the server used the real encrypted file from the data owner as the input of the protocol. In that
sense, the evaluation result is authenticated to the client. The design of the protocol deviates from
the traditional paradigm of using zero-knowledge proof techniques to enforce the correct behavior
of the participants. Instead, we leveraged novel algebraic techniques that make the evaluation result
verifiable so that any misbehavior by the server would be easily detected by the client, without
resorting to zero-knowledge techniques. This results in the first published protocol that we are
aware to perform secure DFA evaluation on both encrypted and authenticated data.
Motivated by the growing trend of outsourcing computation from resource-constrained devices
(e.g., smartphones) to more powerful proxy servers to assist in its computation, in Chapter 5 we
presented a protocol that allows a user to outsource her DFA evaluations to a proxy server by sending
an “encrypted” DFA to the proxy, which then interacts with the server hosting the encrypted file to
obtain an encrypted evaluation result for the user. This protocol differs from the one developed
in Chapter 3 in that it additionally protects the privacy of the DFA from an honest-but-curious
proxy (or client), thus allowing a user to outsource the computation without divulging the query
to the proxy. We then went on to develop an optimized protocol that offers an order-of-magnitude
of improvement on the protocol efficiency with similar security properties. We detailed a series
of optimization techniques we employed and proved the protocol protects the privacy of the DFA
and file contents from arbitrarily malicious server and honest-but-curious proxy adversaries. To
provide insight on the performance of our protocol in a real world application, we implemented our
optimized protocol and a prototype for an encrypted email system. We evaluated its performance
using a real-world email datasets and demonstrated the practicality of the protocol.
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